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ABSTRACT 
EULENA M. JONSSON: Where Disappointment and Regret Collide: Agency, Emotion, and 
Hindsight Bias 
(Under the direction of Dr. Lawrence J. Sanna) 
Emotions serve as sources of information to the decision-maker and thus can impact 
the judgment and decision-making biases people are prone to exhibit.  This dissertation 
examines the role of specific emotions such as disappointment, relief, regret, and satisfaction 
in the generation of hindsight bias or the “knew-it-all-along” effect after self-relevant 
outcomes.  I proposed that such emotions provide agency or attribution information to the 
decision-maker.  Specifically, I hypothesized that when people do not feel responsible for the 
outcome received, or circumstances-agency, they experience disappointment and relief.  
Hindsight bias would be shown after disappointment but not after relief.  When people do 
feel responsible for the outcome received, or self-agency, they experience regret and 
satisfaction.  In this case hindsight bias would not be shown after regret, but would be shown 
after satisfaction.  Study 1 (n = 116) found support for the hypotheses made in the self-
agency condition, but not in the circumstances-agency condition.  Study 2 (n = 260) 
demonstrated that it is difficult to change the emotions that participants feel, with some 
changes evidenced in direct emotion measures.  In regards to hypotheses about hindsight bias 
effects, the findings of Study 2 largely replicated those of Study 1.
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 Consider the following excerpt taken from an interview between Matt Lauer, co-host 
of NBC's morning show “Today” and then Secretary of State Colin Powell: 
MR. LAUER: Mr. Secretary, good morning to you. 
 
SECRETARY POWELL: Good morning, Matt. 
 
MR. LAUER: You know better than most people how difficult and deadly war can be. 
You've served this country in different capacities in several wars. Did you ever think, 
sir, that we'd be sitting here a year and a half after the invasion of Iraq with 1,000 
dead and almost 7,000 wounded and still no end in sight to the insurgency? 
 
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, of course, I couldn't have known that.... 
(Lauer, 2004) 
 
  Once people know the outcome of an event they tend to feel that the outcome was 
both inevitable and foreseeable, this phenomenon having been coined hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Wood, 1978).  There are times, however, when 
people do not show hindsight bias, as the above statement from the former Secretary of State 
Colin Powell illustrates. What would lead former secretary Powell to state so forcefully that 
he “couldn't have known” the direction that the Iraqi war would take?  Why would he make 
such a judgment, when several senior State Department officials insist that former Secretary 
Powell had earlier advised President Bush that there were too few troops in Iraq, a concern 
that had been at the forefront from the time US troops entered Iraq in March 2003 (Ricks & 
Wright, 2004)?  Former Secretary Powell has declared on numerous occasions that
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looking back to the beginning of the Iraqi war, the emotion that he feels most is regret that he 
played such a pivotal role in manufacturing support for US involvement in the war (e.g., 
Lehrer, 2005).  Could this emotion that former Secretary Powell continues to feel, regret, be 
a factor in his lack of hindsight bias? Would he have shown hindsight bias, and said instead, 
“We knew it would turn out like this,” if the Iraqi war had ended as quickly and bloodlessly 
as the most optimistic predictions before the war and he instead felt satisfaction? Would he 
have said, “We knew it would turn out like this,” if the outcome was the same, an ongoing 
and bloody war, but if he had not had been one of the principal people soliciting the US 
people's encouragement of the war and he instead felt disappointment?   
  It is my contention that the emotions we experience following the outcome of an 
event depends on our appraisals of the event, these being the specific pattern of evaluations 
and interpretations of the event (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; for review see Scherer, Schorr, 
& Johnstone, 2001) factoring in elements above and beyond just the valence of the outcome 
(e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1987).  Moreover, I argue that the emotional experiences people have mold the 
information that people use to make judgments of outcome likelihood, thereby influencing 
whether or not hindsight bias is evidenced. 
   Following negative outcomes, people tend to consider either how different things 
would have been had the state of the world been different, the disconfirmed expectancies that 
lead to disappointment, or people consider how different things would have been had they 
made a different choice, the bad decisions that lead to regret (O'Rorke & Ortony, 1994; 
Ortony et al., 1988; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000).  The positive 
complements to these two emotions have been relatively neglected, but help tell the full story 
  3 
of these emotions’ influence.  Following a positive outcome, when people feel their negative 
expectancies have been disconfirmed, they experience relief, and when people feel that they 
have made a good decision, they experience satisfaction.  These two pairs of specific 
emotions differ on several appraisal dimensions (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2002), but I proposed that the most important difference is agency, which 
distinguishes whether the cause of the event outcome is the self, some other person, or the 
circumstance, not unlike cause attribution.  Disappointed and relieved people have 
circumstances-agency where they feel no responsibility for the outcome, while regretful and 
satisfied people have self-agency, so that they do feel responsibility for the outcome.  I 
proposed that it is this distinction which leads to differential effects of these two pairs of 
emotions on hindsight bias. 
“I Knew It All Along”: Hindsight Bias 
People tend to believe that they “knew it all along” and tend to exaggerate how 
inevitable the outcome was after they are informed of the outcome of an event.  People’s 
memory of the event and the factors leading up to it become distorted as knowledge of the 
outcome causes people to update the mental models they have of events.  Fischhoff (1975) 
coined the term creeping determinism to refer to this readjustment.  New causal linkages are 
formed, and information that seemed important prior to outcome knowledge loses its 
salience, becoming de-emphasized.  Hindsight bias effects are robust (see Christensen-
Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posava, 2004; Hawkins & 
Hastie, 1990; for reviews).  Hindsight phenomena has been observed in both laboratory and 
nonlaboratory settings, and in domains as diverse as news events (e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth, 
1975),  historical events (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975; Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002a), findings of 
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scientific experiments (e.g., Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977), almanac questions (e.g., Hasher, 
Attig, & Alba, 1981), brainteasers (e.g., Hoch & Lowenstein, 1991), political elections (e.g., 
Leary, 1981; Leary, 1982; Synodinos, 1986), medical judgments (e.g., Arkes, Faust, 
Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Pennington, Rutter, 
McKenna, & Morley, 1980), legal judgments (e.g. Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Rachlinski, 
1998; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973), and even for gustatory judgments (Pohl, Schwarz, 
Sczesny, & Stahlberg, 2003). 
Why do people exhibit hindsight bias?  Some of the possible explanations for the 
existence of the hindsight bias fall under the umbrella of motivational explanations, 
suggesting that hindsight bias is induced by our “hopes, fears, wishes, desires and 
apprehensions” (Renner, 2003, p. 455).  Evidence of self-serving motivations behind the 
hindsight bias has been proffered by making links to personality variables such as the need 
for predictability, the desire to self-present (Campbell & Tesser, 1983), and the need for 
cognition (Verplanken & Pieters, 1988) as well as situational factors such as monetary 
incentives (Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988), outcome favorableness 
(Louie, 1999; Louie et al., 2000), task involvement (Stanovich & West, 1998), and 
attributions (Wasserman, Lampert, & Hastie, 1991).   
On the other hand, some explanations for the hindsight bias are purely cognitive (e.g., 
Beckerian & Bowers, 1983; Hawkins & Hastie 1990), such as memory impairments (e.g., 
Fischhoff, 1975; Hell et al., 1988) and reconstruction biases (e.g., Erdfelder & Buchner 
1998).  Hoffrage and colleagues (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000) have proposed the 
Reconstruction After Feedback with Take The Best (RAFT) model, where hindsight bias is 
described as a by-product of the adaptive process of updating event knowledge.  Given that 
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specific emotions are associated with appraisals that take into account people’s needs, goals, 
ability to cope with consequences, self-ideals, and social norms (Scherer, 2003), I am 
especially interested the explanations for the hindsight bias that have implications for the 
self.   
Why is there such a quantity of literature centered on the hindsight bias?  The  
practical implications of the hindsight bias are significant, and can have consequences as 
profound as death, and losing billions of dollars, or as mundane as performing badly on an 
academic quiz.  The significance of the hindsight bias goes beyond just affecting a person’s 
perception of the probability that an event should have occurred.  Essentially, hindsight bias 
prevents people from learning from their successes and their failures.  It causes people to feel 
overconfident in their abilities since they feel as if they could have predicted the outcomes of 
events.  In a medical setting, students may overestimate their diagnostic abilities after reading 
case studies that document the decisions others have made and the outcomes that have 
resulted (Henriksen & Kaplan, 2003).  Louie (1999) gives an example of the ultimate cost of 
hindsight bias, citing Jon Krakauer’s (1997) description of a tragic Mount Everest from his 
book Into Thin Air where several hikers lost their lives.  A possible explanation suggested for 
their deaths was the overconfidence of their guide who, having led numerous climbing 
expeditions in the past, may have taken unnecessary risks.  Hindsight distortion would have 
led to him to think that he made correct decisions in the past and therefore under-compensate 
for the bad weather they encountered.   
Fearing the touted “dark side” of the hindsight bias, researchers have, almost from its 
identification, tried to reduce or totally eliminate this bias.  It was first believed that since 
hindsight bias is associated with increased confidence in the known outcome, that just 
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thinking of many possible alternative outcomes would provide a remedy, but instead it was 
more often the case that a back-fire effect occurred and that the hindsight bias was intensified 
(Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002b).  Manipulating subjective accessibility experiences was 
found to cause attenuation of the hindsight bias, whether this manipulation was cognitive or 
physiological (e.g. Sanna et al., 2002b; e.g. Sanna et al., 2002a; see Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; 
Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007; for review).  This reduction in hindsight bias, 
termed the “it could never have happened” effect, was shown by participants in 
manipulations including those who had listed many thoughts about the known outcome and 
those who contracted their brows when considering the known outcome.  In this dissertation I 
attempted to show that in addition to thought content and metacognitive experience, 
emotional experience too is a vital component of the cluster of influences on hindsight bias.     
“How Do I Feel About It?”: Specific Emotions 
  Schwarz’ Feelings-as-Information model suggests that the feelings that people have 
are important sources of information when judgments are being made (Schwarz, 1990; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003, 2007).  When this model was first unveiled, the focal point 
was the effect of moods and mood inductions on unrelated judgments, comparing the types 
of judgments made after positive or negative mood inductions (see Clore, Schwarz, & 
Conway, 1994; Elster, 1998; Forgas, 1995; Higgins, 1997; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; for 
reviews).  More recently, researchers have suggested that such a limited focus (1) does not 
fully account for the results that past research has found when examining the effect of simple 
mood inductions on judgments, and (2) is lacking the complexity and predictive power that 
bringing specific emotions into the picture would provide (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & 
Tiedens, 2006; Nabi, 2003).  Consequently, the “Feelings” in this “Feelings-as-Information” 
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model has been expanded to include emotions as well as moods.  Schwarz and Clore (1988, 
2007) distinguished emotions from moods based on differences such as how specific the 
affect-inducing targets are where emotions tend to be specific, intense, and caused by a 
particular event whereas moods tend to be more amorphous (George & Brief, 1995; Frijda, 
1986; Clark & Isen, 1982), and additionally based on duration where emotions tend to be 
more time limited.  
Emotional experience has been investigated extensively in the realm of judgment and 
decision making where (1) emotional reactions are predicted based on pre-outcome 
information of expected probability and magnitude of the outcome (e.g. Bell, 1982, 1985; 
Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 
1997; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 2003), and  (2) behavioral choices are predicted 
based on the emotion elicited prior to people’s choices (e.g. Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 
1999; Rucker & Petty, 2004; Simonson, 1992; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2000).  
Research has expanded to look at the effect of emotions on certain types of judgments.  
Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) showed that even when their participants all felt 
affect of the same negative valence, when asked what forces were responsible for an 
ambiguous social event angry participants were more likely to blame dispositional factors  
than sad participants.  DeSteno and colleagues (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & 
Braverman, 2004; DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000) found that angry participants 
are more likely to stereotype outgroup members than sad or neutral participants.  Specific 
emotions such as anger, fear, and happiness have been found to impact perceptions of risk 
too (Lerner & Keltner, 2001, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), as well as the 
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decision-makers’ depth of processing (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994, Lerner, 
Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tiedens, 2001). 
Counterfactual Emotions: Disappointment & Regret 
Within the specific emotion literature there is a subset of emotions that cry out for a 
link to judgmental biases and specifically hindsight bias research.  Hindsight bias has often 
been linked in the literature to counterfactuals, or alternatives to past reality (Roese, 1997), 
the idea being that when people consider how likely the known outcome was, they consider 
as well how likely the alternative outcome was.  The emotions of interest, disappointment, 
relief, regret, and satisfaction, were first called counterfactual emotions by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) because they are emotions that result when “reality is compared to an 
imagined view of what might have been” (Kahneman & Miller, 1986, p. 139).  In the case of 
disappointment and relief this alternate reality is one in which the situation was different; in 
the case of regret and satisfaction, this alternate reality is one in which the choices made were 
different.   
Emotion Appraisals 
Research to date on these emotions has concentrated on the appraisals that are yoked 
to disappointment and regret, and exploring the differences between the two patterns of 
appraisals; relief and satisfaction have been ignored in this literature.  According to Roseman 
(2001; Roseman et al., 1996), there are nine appraisal dimensions, or factors which 
differentiate specific emotions.  These are: (1) unexpectedness (Was the outcome expected or 
unexpected?); (2) situational state (Did the outcome improve things or make them worse?); 
(3) motivational state (Is the outcome related to wanting to get less of something punishing, 
or more of something rewarding?); (4) probability (Is the outcome certain or uncertain?); (5) 
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agency (What or who caused the outcome?); (6) control potential (Was there something a 
person could do about the outcome or nothing that could be done?); (7) problem type (Did 
the outcome reveal the basic nature of someone or something or did it not?); (8) own power 
(Did the person feel powerful or powerless?); and (9) legitimacy (Did the person think of 
themselves as morally right or wrong?).  The different appraisals that accompany the 
emotions of interest are discussed further below. 
Disappointment and Regret 
People who feel disappointment consider the outcome to be unexpected.  They want 
something pleasurable, but are denied it.  They are more likely to think that they are morally 
right, and that the outcome has been caused by circumstances beyond their control, or 
circumstances-agency (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  Disappointment is associated with 
phenomelogical components such as feeling as if something is missing and lethargy.  
Behavioral components include inaction, and expressions such as weeping.  Strategies for 
reducing disappointment would be to stop moving towards the goal, or avoidance (Roseman, 
2001).  Disappointment is further associated with imagining how things could have turned 
out if the outcome had not been worse than expected, or thinking situational counterfactuals 
(Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998a).   
People who feel regret believe that they could have done something about the event, 
and that it was caused by them, or self-agency (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  Regret is not 
associated with thinking about how things could have turned out in a different state of the 
world, but instead with how things could have turned out if a different choice had been made, 
or generating behavior-focused counterfactuals (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a).  Indeed, 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) underlined the difference between disappointment and regret 
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by showing that disappointed customers are more likely to complain to others, while regretful 
customers are more likely to switch businesses.  Regret is associated with phenomelogical 
components such as feeling like you have made a mistake, feeling sick, or a sinking feeling.  
Behavioral components include wanting a chance to do things over or differently, and 
expressions include closing the eyes, stretching the lips and rolling them together.  Strategies 
for reducing regret would be to correct or improve the outcome, or approach (Roseman, 
2001).   
Regret and Satisfaction 
Similar to disappointment, relief is associated with disconfirmed expectations, but 
instead of having been denied a pleasant outcome, people experiencing relief feel that they 
have escaped an unpleasant outcome (O'Rorke & Ortony, 1994; Ortony et al., 1988).  As the 
positive counterpart to disappointment, I expected that relief would be coupled with 
circumstances-agency as well, where people experiencing relief would feel that the outcome 
was caused by a state of the world that they had no control over.  Furthermore, I expected 
relief to be similar to disappointment in avoid or inaction tendencies where people feeling 
relief would want to get away from the event.  Phenomelogical components of relief include 
amelioration and calming, with behavioral components such as resting and relaxing, and 
expressions such as exhaling and sighing (Roseman, 2001). 
Satisfaction is not linked to alternative states of the world where things could have 
turned out better, but instead to some “chosen alternative” (Oliver, 1997) that resulted in a 
desired outcome.  I thus expected satisfaction, as the conceptual opposite of regret, to be 
associated with self-agency, where people believe that they did have some control over the 
past event.  I expected too that satisfaction would approximate regret in approach or action 
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tendencies, so that people feeling satisfaction would not want to get away from the event, but 
instead would want to go back and change things to make the outcome even better.  No 
phenomelogical reactions have been reported in the literature for satisfaction.   
Where Disappointment and Regret Collide: Agency 
Let us examine the appraisal dimension of interest more closely.  What exactly do I 
mean when I refer to “agency”?  Roseman (2001, p. 68) defined agency as “who or what 
caused the motive-relevant event” and sectioned it into three elements: circumstances-agency, 
other person-agency, and self-agency.  The example Roseman (2001, p. 69) gave to explain 
this concept pertained to a couple whose relationship has broken up.  An appraisal of 
circumstances-agency would be verbalized as “The difficulty of being in a two career couple 
caused the break-up.”  Another person-agency appraisal would be “My partner’s inattention 
to the relationship caused the break-up.”  “My own inattention to the relationship caused the 
break-up,” would represent a self-agency appraisal.  According to Roseman (2001), it is 
combinations of appraisals that influence the emotions felt.  For example, anger results when 
an event is appraised as having an outcome inconsistent with the motive, or being a failure, 
and this outcome is seen as being caused by another person, or other person-agency.  
Disappointment and regret have similar motive-inconsistent outcome appraisals, but the 
outcomes that induce them are further appraised as respectively circumstances-agency and 
self-agency. 
Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002) have conducted research with the goal of making a 
distinction between relief and disappointment.  They asked participants to recall and describe 
a situation where they felt disappointment, regret, sadness or anger.  They then measured 
how much participants believed the different appraisal dimensions had contributed to their 
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felt emotions.  They found that in regards to the emotions disappointment and regret 
participants differed on five of the appraisal dimensions: unexpectedness, motivational state, 
control potential, legitimacy, and agency. In this dissertation I focused on the appraisal 
dimension of agency, which has been suggested as being the chief difference between 
disappointment and regret (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 
2002; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998b), and which I expanded to distinguish relief 
and satisfaction.   
Although this is a viewpoint that has been challenged by researchers who have asked 
if a feeling of responsibility is really essential to the experience of these two emotions, 
disappointment and regret, with the spotlight being on regret in this particular literature 
(Connolly, Ordóñez, & Coughlan, 1997; Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000), Zeelenberg and 
colleagues (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b; 2000) have noted that this difference is a robust 
phenomenon, especially when specific emotion measures are used, as opposed to omnibus 
happiness measures as have been used in studies from which contradictory conclusions were 
drawn.  Connolly et al. (1997) contended that agency does not play a major part in the 
experience of regret.  In a series of experiments participants judged the happiness of two 
students registering for a required undergraduate course, Alan or Bob, who before the start of 
the semester had had an opportunity to change to another course section, or were randomly 
assigned to another section.  The students’ outcomes and the average outcome in other 
sections, or the possible alternative outcomes were manipulated.  Using this methodology, 
Connolly et al. (1997) did not find any effect of the responsibility or agency manipulation.  
Zeelenberg et al. (1998; 2000) replicated these studies and found the same null effect of 
responsibility using a happiness measure.  However, they demonstrated that if 
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disappointment and regret were individually measured, the results were consistent with 
responsibility, or agency, being a defining factor of these two emotions.  They found that 
when the student was randomly assigned to course sections so that self-agency was low and 
circumstances agency was high, and a negative outcome was the result, more disappointment 
was perceived for that student; when the student made a critical choice so that self-agency 
was high and circumstances-agency was low, and a negative outcome was the result, more 
regret was perceived for that student.  
“Am I Responsible?”: Specific Emotions, Agency, and Hindsight Bias 
No research to this point has looked at the influence of specific emotions on post-
outcome judgment biases such as the hindsight bias.  At the most specific emotions are 
measured, and are seen usually as a byproduct of the judgments made, not as a possible 
antecedent (for exceptions see Tykocinski, 2001; Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi, 20021).  In 
attempting to bring emotions more fully under the umbrella of hindsight bias influences, a  
model was generated (Figure 1) where I proposed not only that appraisals of agency lead to 
specific emotions and to specific patterns of hindsight bias, but furthermore that the emotions 
experienced can lead to certain appraisals which then lead to certain patterns of hindsight 
bias.  
“I'm not responsible!” - Disappointment and Relief 
 Disappointment corresponds to an appraisal of a motive-inconsistent, unexpected  
 
____________________________________________ 
 
1In these exceptions (Tykocinski, 2001; Tykocinski et al., 2002), although the emotion disappointment is seen 
as an antecedent to the hindsight bias shown, specific emotions are not the focus of the literature.  Ultimately, 
Tykocinski (2001; Tykocinski et al., 2002) uses the motivation of protecting the self from disappointment as the 
rationale behind the results obtained, but the influence of disappointment is neither directly manipulated nor 
compared to the influence of other negative emotions. 
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outcome and circumstances-agency, so people do not feel responsible for the outcome.  
Pezzo and Pezzo’s (2007) Sensemaking Model of Hindsight Bias predicts that after a 
negative, self-relevant outcome where there is high expectation-outcome congruence, there is 
little to no hindsight bias.  However, after an outcome where the expectation-outcome 
congruence is low and external reasons for the outcome are easy to generate, hindsight bias is 
evidenced.  Pezzo and Pezzo (2007) explain this ironic prediction by suggesting that a 
negative, self-relevant, unexpected outcome activates a search for meaning.  This increased 
search for causal linkages between antecedents and the outcome eventually increases a 
person’s belief in the inevitability of the outcome, resulting in greater hindsight bias if this 
sense-making process is successful.  Disappointment is primarily defined as a disconfirmed 
expectation, as is relief.  Pezzo and Pezzo’s (2007) model, revised from an earlier model 
(Pezzo, 2003) concentrates solely on negatively valenced events, and as such suggests no 
predictions for hindsight bias after emotions such as relief that occur following positively 
valenced events.    
On top of this search for meaning, I suggested that there are self-serving motivations 
that will influence whether or not hindsight bias is shown after disappointment or relief.  
Consider the agency that is associated with the specific appraisals of disappointment and 
relief: circumstances-agency.  People who feel disappointment and relief do not feel 
responsible for the event that has occurred.  They want to distance themselves from the 
outcome by coping, as in the case of disappointment, or moving on, as in the case of relief.  
They are not motivated to learn from the event in the case of failure, or to take credit in the 
case of success.  The retroactive pessimism literature posits that after extreme 
disappointment people are motivated to show coping mechanisms in order to keep going on, 
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and tell themselves that the negative outcome was meant to be and that there was nothing 
they could have done, effectively increasing hindsight bias (Tykocinski, 2001; Tykocinski et 
al., 2002).  I thus predicted hindsight bias after disappointment.  No predictions are made in 
the retroactive pessimism literature or any other literature for the possible effect of relief on 
hindsight bias.  I posited though that since people do not feel responsible for the outcome 
when they feel relief, they will not attempt to take credit, and they will want to get away from 
the situation, because they feel that the outcome easily could have been otherwise and 
negative.  I predicted no hindsight bias after relief. 
“I am responsible!” - Regret and Satisfaction 
 Regret corresponds to an appraisal of a motive-inconsistent outcome where the choice 
made was bad, and self-agency, so people do feel responsible for the outcome.  Louie (1999; 
Louie at al., 2000) predicts that people will take credit for successes by judging them as 
being more inevitable and that they will deny blame for failures by judging them as being 
less inevitable.  In her research, participants have to make choices which turn out to be 
favorable or unfavorable, and she finds that after success, people have more internal thoughts 
focusing on reasons for success, whereas after failure people have more external thoughts 
excusing failure.  In one study (Louie, 1999, Study 2), participants made an informed 
decision as to whether or not to purchase a company’s stock after which they were given 
favorable or unfavorable outcomes with regard to stock performance.  Favorable-feedback 
participants showed increased hindsight bias while the unfavorable-feedback participants 
showed decreased hindsight bias, as compared to no-feedback participants.  
 According to Louie (1999), motivation for this hindsight bias strategy is one of ego 
validation, or self-promotion.  Consider the agency that is associated with regret and 
  16 
satisfaction: self-agency.  Participants who are regretful or satisfied do feel responsible for 
their outcomes.  They are motivated to do over the experience and to make things right in the 
case of regret, and I proposed, to redo the experience and continue to make things right in the 
case of satisfaction.  What is the link between these two emotions, regret and satisfaction, 
and self-serving self-promotional motivation and hindsight bias?  It has been suggested that 
for the self-serving motive to be salient to people, they must feel that they had control over 
the outcome they received, or were responsible for it (Mark, Boburka, Eyssell, Cohen, & 
Mellor, 2003).  In Mark et al. (2003), participants who made choices that led to negative self-
relevant outcomes perceived the outcome to be unforeseeable in hindsight.  If this is the case, 
only regretful or satisfied participants should use a self-serving motive, unlike disappointed 
or relieved people.  Regretful people would want to deny blame for failure, and I predicted 
they would not show hindsight bias.  This prediction would also be expected due to regretful 
people wanting to learn from their mistakes, so that they can “do over” the event in search of 
a more positive outcome.  Satisfied people would want to take credit for their success, 
allowing them to say that the outcome was inevitable, and that they knew all along that they 
would succeed. I therefore predicted that satisfied people would show hindsight bias 
Overview of Current Research and Hypotheses 
In this dissertation the main predictions, as illustrated in Figure 2, were that when a 
person has circumstances-agency, they will show hindsight bias when they feel 
disappointment after a negative outcome, but they will not show hindsight bias when they 
feel relief after a positive outcome.  When a person has self-agency, they will not show 
hindsight bias when they feel regret after a negative outcome, but they will show hindsight 
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bias when they feel satisfaction after a positive outcome.  I predicted the same basic pattern 
of findings for both studies, using different manipulations and measures.  
To test these ideas, I conducted two studies in which the emotion experienced was 
manipulated both by prompting different antecedent appraisals and directly, and judgments 
of outcome likelihood were obtained.  In Study 1, agency and outcome valence were 
manipulated by having participants perform a laboratory task.  They were asked to generate 
two potential answers during the task and were either allowed to choose an answer to submit 
for evaluation, or had an answer chosen randomly for them.  Participants were given false 
feedback that they had either succeeded or failed.  The manipulation in essence created the 
appraisals expected to be linked with specific emotions, and measures were taken of how 
inevitable and how foreseeable participants perceived the outcome to be.  In Study 2, an 
event-recall method was used.  Participants were asked to reconstruct a past academic exam 
experience when they felt one of the four specific emotions, disappointment, relief, regret, or 
satisfaction, after they learned about the outcome. Study 2 extended Study 1 by investigating 
the bidirectionality of the path between emotions and appraisals.  Moreover, Study 2 sought 
to examine the effect of a shift in emotions on hindsight bias.  In order to encourage the 
experience of different emotions, some participants listed either different situations that could 
have occurred that would have led to a different outcome or different choices they could have 
made that could have led to a different outcome.  Taken together, the findings of Studies 1 
and 2 would provide support for emotional experience as an important source of information 
for judgments made and consequently a key factor influencing judgmental biases.
   
CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1 
Overview 
The primary objective of Study1 was to provide initial evidence that appraisals paired 
with the emotions disappointment and regret, as well as their often neglected conceptual 
opposites relief and satisfaction, do influence hindsight bias.  In addition the secondary 
objective was to add to previous findings suggesting that a key difference between 
disappointment and regret is the different appraisals of agency.   
Participants' appraisal of the situation and their emotions were induced by 
manipulating the perceived agency and the outcome valence of a laboratory task.  To 
manipulate agency, participants were either given a choice or not given a choice at a key 
juncture of the laboratory task.  To manipulate outcome valence, participants were given 
false feedback indicating either that they had succeeded in the laboratory task, or that they 
had failed.   
My general prediction was that each combination of agency and outcome valence 
would be matched with a specific emotion being experienced by the participant, as well as a 
distinctive pattern of hindsight bias.  More specifically I predicted that when participants did 
not feel responsible for the outcome, circumstances-agency, they would show hindsight bias 
after a failure, when they felt disappointment, but not after a success, when they felt relief.  
When participants did feel responsible for the outcome, self-agency, I predicted that they 
would not show hindsight bias after a failure, when they felt regret, but they would show 
hindsight bias after success, when they felt satisfaction.  In short, an interaction between 
agency and outcome valence on hindsight estimates was expected.  
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 Study 1 used a laboratory task paradigm.  The design was a 2 (agency: circumstances 
vs. self) x 2 (outcome valence: failure vs. success) between-participants factorial design.  The 
inspiration for Study 1 came from a design used by Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert, 
Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004).   
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 116 undergraduate Introductory Psychology students at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   
Procedure 
 Materials used in this study are located in Appendix A.  Participants were recruited 
for a laboratory experiment entitled “Making Judgments” in groups of ten.  On arrival at the 
experimental session, participants completed a consent form, then received a handout that 
gave them instructions about the task they were to complete as well as the task itself.  They 
were asked to put an ID number on the handout corresponding to where they were sitting, so 
that later in the experiment their handout with feedback could be returned to them.  All 
participants were given the following initial instructions: 
Welcome to our experiment and thanks for participating.  We are conducting a study 
to see how people make real-life decisions such as how much different items cost and 
whether or not to purchase those items. In this particular experiment, we will ask you 
to make judgments about the prices of certain items, specifically plane ticket prices, 
and to put these items in the order asked for.  You will then be asked a series of 
questions about your reactions to this event. 
 All participants were asked to order five popular summer destinations in order of the 
average price of a round-trip plane ticket from Raleigh-Durham International Airport, North 
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Carolina, to that destination.  They were asked to order the destinations descending from the 
most expensive ticket price to the least expensive ticket price.  Participants were asked to 
create not just one but instead two different orders, and were told that these two orders 
should be their two best guesses for the correct order of ticket prices.   All participants were 
informed that those participants who ordered the plane ticket costs correctly would be 
entered into a drawing for $35. 
Agency Manipulation.  Participants were told that of the two orders they created, only 
one would be evaluated, either one that was randomly selected for them or one that they 
themselves chose.  In the circumstances-agency condition, participants received the 
following series of statements:  
You will create two different orders, each descending from 5, the most expensive 
location, to 1, the least expensive location.  These orders will be your two best 
guesses, and different from each other.  The experimenter will look at and evaluate 
both orders, but only one will count, one that will be randomly chosen for you.  This 
order will be the submitted one….  
When you are finished, please continue on to the next page to see which order has 
been randomly chosen to be submitted for you, then give this questionnaire to the 
experimenter…. 
Order #2 has been randomly chosen to be submitted. 
Order #1 will be evaluated too but will not count…. 
In the self-agency condition, participants were told instead: 
You will create two different orders, each descending from 5, the most expensive 
location, to 1, the least expensive location.  These orders will be your two best 
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guesses, and different from each other.  The experimenter will look at and evaluate 
both orders, but only one will count, one that you will choose.  This order will be the 
submitted one…. 
When you are finished, please continue onto the next page to choose the order to be 
submitted, then give this questionnaire to the experimenter…. 
Which order do you choose to be submitted? Circle your choice. 
Order #1 
Order #2… 
After all participants completed the ordering task, the experimenter collected the 
handouts and returned to the front of the class.  The experimenter informed the participants 
that it would take a few minutes to evaluate the orders, and to please sit quietly while the 
evaluation occurred.  The experimenter then sat and proceeded to ostensibly evaluate the 
submitted orders. 
Outcome Valence Manipulation.  The experimenter did not actually evaluate the 
submitted orders that participants created.  Instead the experimenter gave false feedback and 
in so doing randomly placed participants into either failure or success conditions.   
 In the failure condition, participants were given the following false feedback: 
“Submitted: Incorrect (Unsubmitted:  Correct)” while in the success condition, participants 
were given the following false feedback: “Submitted: Correct (Unsubmitted:  Incorrect).” 
Manipulation Checks.  To assess participants’ perception of the agency of the 
outcome, they were asked to rate on a scale of 0 (Not at all responsible) to 9 (Very 
responsible) their response to the question, “How responsible did you feel for the outcome of 
the event?”  They were also asked to rate on a scale of 0 (Not at all in control) to 9 (Very in 
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Control) their response to the question, “How much control did you have over the outcome 
of the event?”   
 Participants’ perception of the outcome valence of the outcome was assessed by two 
questions.  They were asked to rate on a scale of 0 (Not at all positive) to 9 (Very positive) 
their response to the question, “To what extent was the outcome positive?”  They were asked 
too to rate on a scale of 0 (Not at all negative) to 10 (Very negative) their response to the 
question, “To what extent was the outcome negative?” 
Specific Emotions Measures.  The specific emotions of interest were assessed using 
both direct and indirect measures.  Participants were first asked to rate on a scale of 0 (Not at 
all) to 9 (Very) the extent to which they feel each emotion: disappointment, relief, regret, and 
satisfaction.   
Disappointment and relief were then assessed indirectly by participants' responses to 
the following questions: “To what extent was the outcome expected?” (0 = Not at all 
expected; 9 = Very expected); “To what extent was the outcome unexpected?” (0 = Not at all 
unexpected; 9 = Very unexpected); and “To what extent did you feel a tendency to want to 
get away from the event after you knew the outcome?” (0 = I did not at all want to get away 
from the event; 9 = I very much wanted to get away from the event). 
Regret and satisfaction were also assessed indirectly through the following measures: 
“To what extent was the outcome of the event the result of a choice you made?” (0 = Not at 
all a result; 9 = Very much a result)); and “To what extent did you feel a tendency to want to 
go back and change things after you knew the outcome?” (0 = I did not at all want to change 
things; 9 = I very much wanted to change things). 
Probability Judgment.  The hindsight bias that participants showed regarding their 
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task outcome was assessed using three items.  “To what extent would you say that the 
outcome you experienced was inevitable?” (0 = Not at all inevitable; 9 = Very inevitable); 
“To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was foreseeable?” (0 = Not 
at all foreseeable; 9 = Very foreseeable); and (3) a third measure: 
Think back to right before you were given feedback on your ordering.  If someone 
had asked you at that point how likely you were to get the feedback that your 
submitted order was correct, what would you have said?   
Give a percentage ranging from 0% to 100%, where 0% would mean “I thought there 
was no chance of it being correct,” and 100% would mean “I thought it would 
definitely be correct.” 
________% 
Participants were thanked, debriefed, and informed that all participants would be entered into 
the $35 drawing.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks.  The two agency manipulation check questions were 
significantly correlated, r(116) = .68, p < .001.  A combined agency score was created for 
purposes of analysis, by addition of the responses to the two questions.  Participants in the 
self-agency condition (M = 14.25, SD = 3.93) viewed themselves as being more in control of 
and having more responsibility for the outcome than participants in the circumstances-agency 
condition (M = 10.40, SD = 5.62), F(1, 114) = 18.04, p < .001.   The agency manipulation 
was effective. 
  The two outcome valence manipulation check questions were also significantly 
correlated, r(116) = .54, p < .001, with the question “To what extent was the outcome 
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negative?” reverse scored.  A combined outcome valence score was created by addition of 
the responses to the two questions.  Participants in the positive outcome condition (M = 5.09, 
SD = 3.21) viewed the outcome of the task as having been more positive than participants in 
the negative outcome condition (M = 2.66, SD = 3.03), F(1, 114) = 170.52, p < .001.   The 
outcome valence manipulation was effective. 
 Direct Emotion Measures.  The four direct emotion measures measuring 
disappointment, regret, relief, and satisfaction were first assessed by a MANOVA in which 
outcome valence and agency were between-subject factors.  Only the main effect for 
outcome valence was significant, with multivariate F(4,109) = 52.38, p < .001.  Individual 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. 
Individual ANOVAs showed that the main effect for outcome valence was valid for 
all four measures, Fs > 50.00, dfs = 1,112, ps < .01.  Participants gave higher ratings of 
disappointment (M = 4.44, SD = 2.54) and regret (M = 3.24, SD = 2.92) in the negative 
outcome conditions than in the positive outcome conditions (respectively, M = .17, SD = .64 
and M = .17, SD = .78).  Higher ratings of relief (M = 4.36, SD = 3.08) and satisfaction (M = 
7.53, SD = 1.90) were given in the positive outcome conditions than in the negative outcome 
conditions (respectively, M = 2.94, SD = 2.48 and M = 3.48, SD = 2.15).   Even though the 
interaction effect was not significant, ratings of each emotion except for relief followed the 
expected patterns in the different experimental condition as Figure 3 illustrates.  For 
example, not only were ratings of disappointment higher in the negative valence condition 
than in the positive valence condition, but additionally, within the negative valence 
condition, ratings increased going from the self-agency (M = 4.30, SD = 2.55) to the 
circumstances-agency condition (M = 4.58, SD = 2.57).   
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Indirect Emotion Measures.  The five indirect emotion measures were similarly 
assessed by a MANOVA with outcome valence and agency as the between-subject factors.  
These measures gauged, respectively, how unexpected or expected participants viewed the 
outcome as being, whether they viewed the outcome as the result of a choice they had made, 
and whether they wanted to go back and change things or to get away from the event after 
knowing the outcome.  The main effects for both feedback, multivariate F(5, 108) = 35.04, p 
< .001, and agency, multivariate F(5,108) = 2.35, p < .05, were significant, with the 
interaction effect approaching significance, multivariate F(5,108) = 2.02, p = .08.  Individual 
means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 2. 
Univariate ANOVAs confirmed that participants given positive feedback were 
significantly more likely to rate the outcome as having been unexpected (M = 4.51, SD = 
2.54) and less likely to rate it as being expected (M = 4.66, SD = 2.35) than participants given 
negative feedback (M = 3.62, SD = 2.03 and M = 5.79, SD = 2.03 respectively), Fs > 4.00, 
dfs = 1,112, ps < .05.  Participants given positive feedback were significantly less likely to 
want to go back and change the outcome (M = .06, SD = .23), but also less likely to want to 
get away from the event (M = .77, SD = 1.73), Fs > 10.00, dfs = 1,112, ps < .005 than 
participants receiving negative outcomes (M = 5.60, SD = 3.26 and M = 2.16, SD = 2.63, 
respectively).  Generally negative outcomes tend to be seen as more unexpected than positive 
outcomes (Roese & Olson, 1996), so these results were a bit surprising. 
Univariate ANOVAs confirmed too that participants in the self-agency conditions (M 
= 7.61, SD = 2.25) were significantly more likely to report that the outcome was a result of a 
choice they had made than participants in the circumstances-agency condition (M = 5.93, SD 
= 2.95), F(1,112) = 79.48, p < .005.  This result supported my hypotheses. 
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In examining the interaction effects, univariate ANOVAS showed that to participants 
in the positive feedback condition, an outcome if they were in the self-agency condition  (M 
= 5.35, SD = 2.33) was significantly more expected than if they were in the circumstances-
agency conditions (M = 4.00, SD = 2.22).  Conversely, for participants in the negative 
valence condition, an outcome if they were in the circumstances-agency (M = 6.30, SD = 
1.98) condition was more expected than if they were in the self-agency condition (M = 5.23, 
SD = 1.98).  This pattern of results fit what was hypothesized for the positive valence 
condition, but not for the negative valence condition.   
Probability Judgment.  To evaluate the probability judgments generated by 
participants, a MANOVA was run on the three hindsight bias measures, with outcome 
valence and agency as the two between-subject factors.  The main effects for both feedback, 
multivariate F(3,110) = 7.21, p < .001, and the interaction effect, multivariate F(3,110) = 
2.75, p < .05, were significant.  Individual means and standard deviations for the three 
hindsight bias measures are presented in Table 3. 
Examination of the univariate ANOVAs indicated that the main effect for feedback 
was valid for both the measure assessing how foreseeable participants viewed the outcome 
and the numerical probability judgment participants generated, Fs > 5.00, dfs = 1,112, ps < 
.05.  Participants in the positive valence conditions (M = 59.72, SD = 24.64) reported a 
higher likelihood of having produced a correct order than participants in the negative valence 
conditions (M = 49.24, SD = 24.95).  However, participants in the positive valence conditions 
(M = 4.34, SD = 2.47) viewed the outcome as having been less foreseeable than participants 
in the negative valence conditions (M = 5.90, SD = 2.10).  This latter result does seem to fit 
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with the results from the indirect emotion measures analysis indicating that participants 
viewed a positive outcome as having been more unexpected. 
The interaction effect was valid for the measure assessing how likely participants 
thought they were to be correct in their ordering, F(1,112) = 4.85, p < .05, and approached 
significance for the other two measures, Fs > 3, dfs = 1,112, ps < .09.  The interaction effect 
was examined, and given the very specific predictions for hindsight bias effects several 
planned contrasts (Rosenthal, Rubin, & Rubin, 2000; Furr & Rosenthal, 2003) were 
conducted on the probability judgment data.  As diagrammed in Figure 4, when feeling 
responsible for the outcome, in the self-agency condition, participants given positive 
feedback (M = 68.42, SD = 20.94) reported a higher likelihood of having produced a correct 
order than participants given negative feedback (M = 47.73, SD = 22.80), t(112) = 3.18, p < 
.005.  In contrast, when not feeling responsible for the outcome, in the circumstances-agency 
condition, the reported likelihoods of producing a correct order were not significantly 
different from each other for participants in both valence conditions.  Thus, my hypotheses 
for when hindsight bias would be shown were supported by findings in the self-agency 
conditions, but not by participants in the circumstances-agency conditions. 
Study 1 provided initial evidence for some of my hypotheses.  First, Study 1 
suggested that the difference between disappointment and relief, and regret and satisfaction 
may be agency.  The pattern of participants’ ratings for direct emotions was promising.  
Although the scores for similarly valenced conditions were not significantly different, the 
overall pattern was as predicted, except for relief.  Added support for the supposition that 
agency may be a key factor in differentiating the emotions of disappointment, relief, regret, 
and satisfaction, came from the finding that participants in the self-agency conditions felt that 
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the outcome was more of a choice made than participants in the circumstances-agency 
conditions.    
Two factors may have led to less support for hypotheses concerning agency as an 
emotion differentiator.  Although pilot testing and post-session interviews of participants 
revealed that participants had a reasonable expectation of completing the laboratory task 
successfully, end results found that participants receiving positive feedback found that to be 
unexpected.  It could be that participants found the task harder than initially surmised.  This 
could have affected the intensity of emotions felt, especially those with linked appraisals of 
disconfirmed expectations such as disappointment and relief.  Secondly, even with 
participants in the circumstances-agency condition having their submitted order randomly 
chosen for them, the act of creating the two orders themselves could have acted as an 
impediment to the feeling of lack of control over the outcome. 
In regards to hindsight bias, Study 1 provided initial evidence that people’s appraisals 
of events do influence the estimates of outcome likelihood generated.  In the self-agency 
appraisals condition, participants with positive feedback showed hindsight bias, whereas 
participants with negative feedback did not.  On the other hand, in the circumstances-agency 
appraisals condition, participants in both valence conditions showed a similar lack of 
hindsight bias.  Such a finding, though exciting, supported only half of the hypotheses put 
forth, for participants in the self-agency conditions.  In Study 2 another test of the appraisal-
hindsight bias link was carried out using different methodologies to observe if the results of 
Study 1 would be reproduced, and in that case, to supply enhanced clarification of Study 1’s 
findings. 
   
CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
Overview 
In Study 1 the groundwork was set for showing that appraisals both induce emotions 
and influence hindsight bias.  Study 2 was designed to build on this foundation, extending the 
findings of Study 1 by showing that emotions can actually lead to the appraisals that affect 
hindsight bias.  Furthermore, in Study 2 the pattern of hindsight bias occurring as 
participants’ emotions were manipulated was investigated.    
For the second study participants were asked to recall and describe a past event when 
they felt a certain emotion.  Participants’ appraisal of agency and outcome valence were 
subsequently measured as well as outcome likelihood estimates.  In some conditions 
participants were asked to list thoughts about ways the situation could have been different, 
leading to a different outcome while other participants were asked to list other choices they 
could have made that could have led to different outcomes.  Asking participants to create 
these types of thoughts is a methodology that has been successful in inducing disappointment 
and regret (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a).  When participants think of ways the situation could 
have been different they tend to feel disappointment following a negative outcome, whereas 
when participants think of different choices they could have made they tend to feel regret.  I 
hypothesized that asking participants to list such thoughts would in effect prompt, in the 
relevant conditions, a shift in participants’ emotions from disappointment to regret or from 
regret to disappointment, and the same with the emotions relief and satisfaction.  The 
hindsight bias pattern was expected to change correspondingly.   
My general prediction mirrored that of Study 1, namely that the specific emotions that 
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participants recalled experiencing would be paired with a combination of agency and 
outcome valence in addition to a distinctive pattern of hindsight bias.  Specifically I predicted 
that when thinking back on an outcome that led to disappointment, participants would exhibit 
more hindsight bias in the control and circumstances-agency conditions than in the self-
agency condition.  After recalling an outcome that led to relief, participants would exhibit 
less hindsight bias in the control and circumstances-agency conditions than in the self-agency 
condition.  Conversely, when thinking back on an outcome that led to regret, participants 
would exhibit less hindsight bias in the control and self-agency conditions than in the 
circumstances-agency condition.  After recalling an outcome that led to satisfaction, 
participants would exhibit more hindsight bias in the control and self-agency conditions than 
in the circumstances-agency condition.   
 The design of Study 2 was a 4 (initial emotion: disappointment vs. relief vs. regret vs. 
satisfaction) x 3 (thoughts agency: control/no thoughts vs. circumstances-agency vs. self-
agency) factorial design.   
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred sixty-five Introductory Psychology students at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill participated and were distributed approximately equally among 
conditions.  Five participants failed to properly complete the thoughts-listing task by which 
agency was manipulated (no thoughts vs. circumstances agency vs. self-agency); their data 
was dropped from the analyses.  Usable data were thus obtained for 260 participants. 
Procedure 
 Materials for this study are located in Appendix B.  Participants were recruited for a 
laboratory experiment entitled “Life Events”.  On arrival at the experimental session, 
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participants completed a consent form, then were asked to complete the given questionnaire.  
The initial instructions in the questionnaire stated:   
We are conducting a study to see if people’s recollections of past events are impacted 
by how they have been socialized. This is a collaborative research effort between 
researchers in universities across the country.  In this particular experiment, we will 
ask you to recall a particular past event and then to answer questions about your 
reactions to it.  We ask that you describe the event you are recalling in as much detail 
as you can, and try to imagine yourself in the situation as if it were actually occurring 
to you at this moment.   
 Initial Emotion Manipulation.  Participants were given the following instructions, 
with the emotion induced being disappointment, relief, regret, or satisfaction: 
We want you to recall a past experience that happened within the last three years. 
Specifically we want you to recall an academic exam experience you have had where 
you felt [emotion] after you found out the outcome. 
Please use the space given below and on the next page if needed to describe this event 
when you felt [emotion].  Be vivid and detailed enough so that a reader experiences 
the event in the same way that you did.   
Participants were given two pages in which to describe this event. 
Thoughts Agency Manipulation.  Participants in the control/no thoughts condition 
were given no additional instructions before being asked to continue on in the questionnaire.   
In the circumstances-agency condition, participants in the negative emotion 
conditions, disappointment and regret, were further instructed: “In the spaces provided 
below, please list 5 ways the situation could have been different that would have led to a 
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better outcome occurring.”  Five spaces were provided, each with the given beginning, 
“There could have ….” 
In the circumstances-agency condition, participants in the positive emotion 
conditions, relief and satisfaction, were instructed: “In the spaces provided below, please list 
5 ways the situation could have been different that would have led to a worse outcome 
occurring.”  Five spaces were provided, each with the given beginning, “There could have 
….” 
In the self-agency condition, participants in the negative emotion conditions, 
disappointment and regret, were instructed: “In the spaces provided below, please list 5 
different choices you could have made that would have led to a better outcome occurring.”  
Five spaces were provided, each with the given beginning, “I could have ….” 
In the self-agency condition, participants in the positive emotion conditions, relief and 
satisfaction, were instructed: “In the spaces provided below, please list 5 different choices 
you could have made that would have led to a worse outcome occurring.”  Five spaces were 
provided, each with the given beginning, “I could have ….” 
Manipulation Checks and Specific Emotion Measures.  The measures assessing the 
effectiveness of the initial emotion manipulation (control/no thoughts condition) as well as 
the thoughts agency manipulation were similar to those used in Study 1.  These same 
emotion measures were used to determine whether the predicted emotion switching occurred 
in the circumstances-agency and self-agency conditions. 
Some participants were asked to answer an additional manipulation check positioned 
at the end of the questionnaire.  It assessed the ease or difficulty of the thought listing task 
with the question, “You were asked to list 5 thoughts about the past event described that 
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could have led to a different outcome.  To what extent was it difficult or easy to generate 
those 5 thoughts?” (-4 = Difficult to generate; 4 = Easy to generate). 
Probability Judgment.  The hindsight bias that participants showed regarding the past 
event outcome was assessed using the same two measures of inevitability and foreseeability 
used in Study 1 as well as a third measure: 
Think back to a time before you knew the outcome of the exam.  
If someone had asked you at that point how likely you were to perform badly/well on 
the exam, what would you have said?  Give a percentage ranging from 0% to 100%, 
where 0% would mean “I thought there was no chance of it turning out badly/well,” 
and 100% would mean “I knew it would definitely turn out badly/well.” 
________% 
The questionnaire was collected after which participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation Check.  The analyses assessing the effectiveness of the emotion 
inductions were restricted to the control/no agency conditions, n = 66. Representative 
samples of the descriptions participants generated under the emotion inductions include, for 
disappointment: 
…I anxiously awaited the results, expecting at worst an A-.  The day we got it back, I 
expected to be able to call home and tell about my excellent grade.  Instead, a big C 
was scrawled across the top of the page…. 
Descriptions of events where participants felt regret include:  
…I should not have gone out of town and instead should have spent the week 
studying.  In addition, I wasted my time reading the biology chapters instead of just 
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studying my class notes, which the teacher emphasized would be the most 
important…. 
Participants with a relief induction described events such as:  
…Though my Spanish was good, I had only taken Spanish III (out of IV) prior to 
taking AP Spanish, so I felt to be in somewhat of a disadvantage...After those months 
of waiting, I finally got my scores.  I had gotten 5s on 3 other exams, but the icing on 
the cake was the “3” next to AP Spanish…. 
Finally, participants presented with a satisfaction induction described the following kinds of 
events:  
…I had kept up with the readings, found a tutor, and studied a week straight.  I made 
sure I knew the material!...When the score finally was put up, I saw I made a 90, an 
A-.  I was so excited b/c my work had paid off…   
There was a main effect of emotion induced for all of the direct emotion measures, Fs 
> 15.00, dfs = 3, 62, ps < .001.  Means and standard deviations are displayed in the control 
agency/no thoughts rows of Table 4.  For each emotion induced, the mean score of that 
emotion condition on the measure assessing that particular emotion was the highest.  For 
example, participants in the disappointment condition (M = 7.65, SD = 2.26) scored higher 
on the disappointment measure than participants in the relief (M = 1.56, SD = 2.19), regret 
(M = 6.53, SD = 2.62), and satisfaction (M = .63, SD = 1.31) conditions.  Planned contrasts 
indicated that for each emotion measure the difference between the mean scores of an 
emotion induced and each of the oppositely valenced emotions induced was significant, ts > 
4.00, dfs = 62, ps < .001.  However, on each emotion measure the difference between the 
mean scores of an emotion induced and the similarly valenced emotion was not significant.   
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The main effect of emotion induced was significant for three of the indirect emotion 
measures: the extent to which the outcome was expected, whether participants wanted to go 
back and change the outcome, and whether participants wanted to get away from the event 
after the outcome was known, Fs > 3.00, dfs = 3, 62, ps < .05.  To participants induced to feel 
disappointment, the outcome was significantly less expected (M = 3.06, SD = 2.77) than to 
participants induced to feel satisfaction (M = 5.38, SD = 1.54) or relief (M = 4.69, SD = 
1.99).  Participants induced to feel either disappointment (M = 7.88, SD = 1.62 and M = 6.76, 
SD = 2.82, respectively) or regret (M = 7.06, SD = 2.93 and M = 5.53, SD = 2.79, 
respectively) were significantly more likely to say that they would like to go back and change 
the outcome or to get away from the event than participants in either the relief  (M = 2.06, SD 
= 2.52 and M = 3.25, SD = 3.19, respectively) or satisfaction  (M = 1.63, SD = 2.53 and M = 
2.56, SD = 2.76, respectively) conditions.  
Direct Emotion Measures.  A MANOVA was used to assess the four direct emotion 
measures for disappointment, regret, relief, and satisfaction, with emotion induced and 
thoughts agency as the between-subject factors, using the full data, n = 260.  Both the main 
effect for emotion induced, multivariate F(12, 648) = 54.39, p < .001, and the interaction 
effect, multivariate F(24, 856) = 1.73, p < .05, were significant.   
Individual ANOVAs showed that the main effect for emotion induced was valid for 
all four measures, Fs > 110.00, dfs = 3, 248, ps < .001.  The interaction effect was significant 
only for two measures, those assessing regret and satisfaction, Fs > 2.00, dfs = 6, 248, ps < 
.05.  A series of planned contrasts were carried out to assess the specific predictions made.  
Individual means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 4. 
  36 
I expected that on the measure of disappointment, participants in the circumstances-
agency condition instructed to describe outcomes after which they felt disappointment (M = 
8.00, SD = .97) or regret (M = 7.91, SD = 1.08) would score significantly higher than 
participants in the control/no thoughts agency condition instructed to describe an experience 
after which they felt regret (M = 6.53, SD = 2.62).  Both hypotheses were supported, 
respectively t(248) = 2.48, p < .05, and t(248) = 2.40, p < .05.  Evidence was not found for 
any other predictions made for the direct emotion measures.   
Indirect Emotion Measures.  The five indirect emotion measures were similarly 
assessed by a MANOVA with emotion induced and thoughts agency as the between-subject 
factors.  Only the main effect for emotion induced, multivariate F(15, 674) = 25.21, p < .001, 
was significant.  Individual means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 5. 
Individual ANOVAs pointed out that the main effect for emotion induced was 
significant for all five indirect emotion measures, Fs > 6, dfs = 3, 248, ps < .001.  
Interestingly, planned contrasts confirmed that the hypotheses for measures assessing the 
expectedness and unexpectedness of the outcome were supported.  Participants were 
significantly more likely to see the outcome as unexpected and significantly less likely to see 
the outcome as expected in the disappointment (M = 5.82, SD = 2.11 and M = 3.29, SD = 
2.34, respectively) and relief (M = 5.33, SD = 2.37 and M = 3.79, SD = 2.32, respectively) 
conditions than participants in the regret (M = 4.26, SD = 2.50 and M = 4.74, SD = 2.60, 
respectively) and satisfaction (M = 4.30, SD = 2.53 and M = 6.00, SD = 2.06, respectively) 
conditions, t(256) = 4.35, p < .001 and t(256) = 5.19, p < .001 respectively.  This pattern was 
seen too in the measure assessing whether participants thought the outcome was a result of a 
choice they had made, where participants in the disappointment (M = 5.00, SD = 2.65) and 
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relief (M = 6.91, SD = 1.97) conditions were significantly less likely to agree than 
participants in the regret (M = 7.00, SD = 2.31) and satisfaction (M = 7.37, SD = 1.95) 
conditions, t(256) = 4.42, p < .001.  On the other hand, for measures assessing wanting to go 
back and change the outcome or wanting to get away from the event after knowing the 
outcome, it was only the valence of the emotion induced that mattered, where participants in 
the disappointment  (M = 7.90, SD = 1.69 and M = 6.42, SD = 2.36, respectively) and regret  
(M = 7.72, SD = 1.96 and M = 6.49, SD = 2.12, respectively) conditions were significantly 
more likely to both want to go back and change and to get away from the outcome than 
participants in the relief  (M = 2.31, SD = 2.41 and M = 2.69, SD = 3.10, respectively) and 
satisfaction  (M = 2.00, SD = 2.68 and M = 2.38, SD = 2.83, respectively) conditions, 
respectively t(256) = 20.06, p < .001 and t(256) = 12.04, p < .001.   
Thoughts Agency.  I did not expect to find a significant difference among thoughts 
agency groups for the ease or difficulty of generating the list of thoughts.  However, although 
all but five participants properly completed the thoughts agency manipulation task, filling in 
five thoughts as required, participants asked to generate circumstances-agency thoughts (M = 
-.28, SD = 2.49) found these thoughts significantly more difficult to generate than 
participants asked to generate self-agency thoughts (M = .97, SD = 2.47), F(1,192) = 12.13, p 
< .005. 
Probability Judgment.  To appraise the probability judgments generated by 
participants, a MANOVA was run on the three hindsight bias measures, with emotion 
induced and thoughts agency as the two between-subject factors.  Only the main effect for 
feedback was significant, multivariate F(9,599) = 9.21, p < .001.  Individual means and 
standard deviations for the three hindsight bias measures are presented in Table 6. 
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Individual ANOVAs gave evidence that the main effect for emotion induced was 
valid for two of the hindsight bias measures, the likelihood estimate of the known outcome 
occurring, F(3, 248) = 25.32, p < .001, and how foreseeable the participants viewed the 
outcome as being, F(3,248) = 14.62, p < .001.  Given the specific predictions for the 
hindsight bias measures, several planned contrasts were conducted.  The results for both 
foreseeability and likelihood estimates followed similar patterns, where support was found 
for hypotheses concerning emotions linked to self-agency.  Participants induced to feel 
satisfaction (M = 76.16, SD = 20.10) reported a significantly higher likelihood of producing 
the known outcome than participants induced to feel regret (M = 52.97, SD = 29.52), t(256) = 
5.17, p < .001.  The findings for the likelihood estimates are diagrammed in Figure 5.  
Similarly, participants induced to feel satisfaction (M = 6.08, SD = 1.60) were significantly 
more likely to rate the outcome as having been foreseeable than participants induced to feel 
regret (M = 4.70, SD = 2.02), t(256) = 3.38, p < .005.  As in Study 1, hypotheses were not 
supported for emotions linked to circumstances-agency.  Indeed, participants in the 
disappointment conditions (M = 36.88, SD = 27.85) reported a significantly lower likelihood 
of obtaining the known outcome than participants in the relief conditions (M = 61.20, SD = 
23.57), t(256) = 5.39, p < .001. 
In Study 2 the question of how appraisals are linked to emotions and to hindsight bias 
was examined using a recall task instead of a laboratory task.  The approach of Study 2 
allowed participants’ appraisals of the past events to be potentially manipulated by having 
them think of either situational or behavioral counterfactuals in some conditions, in addition 
to the original emotion inductions.  The purpose of such a manipulation was to examine if the 
agency of the induced emotional experiences could be increased or decreased.  Results 
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suggested that the thought manipulations were not successful.  It may be more difficult to 
change the agency of an emotional experience once it has been labeled, than to create a frame 
for an emotional experience before a label is given.  This would be an interesting route to 
travel in future research. 
In regards to the appraisals-emotion link, some results did change from Study 1 
suggesting that they may have been artifacts of the Study 1 design.  I refer to the 
unexpectedness and expectedness measures.  The results of these indirect emotion measures 
did support predicted hypotheses in Study 2, where participants in the disappointment and 
regret conditions found their outcomes in that past academic event to be more unexpected 
and less expected than participants in the regret and satisfaction conditions.  Other results, 
such as the association between agency, or in the case of Study 2, specific agency-associated 
emotions and participants’ ratings of choice, were similar to the results of Study 1.  
Participants in emotion conditions associated with self-agency, regret and satisfaction, 
reported perceiving the outcome as more of a choice they had made than participants in the 
emotion conditions associated with circumstances-agency, disappointment and relief. 
More importantly, when it came to hindsight bias, the results of Study 1 were 
replicated in Study 2 in that hypotheses were only supported for the self-agency conditions.  
For participants induced to feel emotions associated with self-agency, in the regret and 
satisfaction conditions, participants reported feeling hindsight bias after satisfaction but not 
after regret.  However, for participants induced to feel emotions associated with 
circumstances-agency, some hindsight bias was actually displayed by participants in the 
relief conditions, with participants in the disappointment conditions not showing any 
hindsight bias.
   
CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In my dissertation I endeavored to find introductory evidence of the link between 
emotions, appraisals, and judgment and decision biases, specifically hindsight bias.  One 
main goal of the two studies presented was to show that the emotions of interest, 
disappointment, relief, regret, and satisfaction are each linked to a distinct pattern of 
appraisals.  A second main objective was to show that emotions generated and their 
associated appraisals lead to a characteristic pattern of hindsight bias being exhibited.  
Different methodologies were used in Studies 1 and 2, and in both studies partial support for 
my predictions was found. 
 Study 1 laid the important foundation for examining the relationship between 
emotions, appraisals, and hindsight bias.  The feedback that participants received as well as 
their perception of how responsible they were for the outcome were manipulated.  In terms of 
the emotion felt, I predicted that participants in the circumstances-agency/negative valence 
condition would score highest on the disappointment measure and that participants in the 
circumstances-agency/positive valence condition would score highest on the relief measure.  
I predicted too that participants in the self-agency/negative valence condition would score 
highest on the regret measure, and participants in the self-agency/positive valence condition 
would score highest on the satisfaction measure.  The trend seen in the scores of emotions on 
direct emotion measures fit the predictions made for all emotions, except for relief.  However
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significant differences were only found between differently valenced emotions rather than an 
interaction effect between outcome valence and agency.  The results on the indirect emotion 
measures supported hypotheses made for the measure assessing whether participants viewed 
the outcome as having been a result of choices made.  Findings on other indirect emotion 
measures suggested that participants did not expect to receive a positive outcome on the task 
they performed.   
Concerning hindsight bias effects, the results provided evidence supporting 
hypotheses made for self-agency, but not for circumstances-agency.  When participants felt 
responsibility for the outcome received, they showed hindsight bias after positive feedback 
but not after negative feedback.  When participants did not feel responsibility for the 
outcome received, there was no difference in the amount of hindsight bias shown after 
positive or negative feedback.  Initially, I supposed that the chief possible explanations for 
the lack of support for predictions in the circumstances-agency conditions were that the 
emotion ratings for participants in the relief condition did not follow the predicted pattern 
and in addition that participants allotted negative feedback were expecting such an outcome.  
However, results from Study 2 led to an alteration in this line of thinking. 
Study 2 further examined the association between emotions and appraisals, this time 
with emotions being directly generated first and as in Study 1, hindsight bias being measured.  
Additionally, in Study 2 an effort was made to change the emotions felt though manipulating 
the agency of thoughts participants were asked to generate.  Evidence of a shift in emotions 
felt was found for a few conditions, but in general it seemed that once participants were led 
to think of and articulate a certain emotional experience, there was some difficulty in fully 
reconceptualizing that experience as having been followed by a different emotion, moreso 
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than if the thoughts manipulation had been the sole activator of emotion experience recall.  
Difficulty in emotion switching could be connected too to the minute though significant 
difference in difficulty of generation of thoughts in different thought agency conditions.   
In regards to hindsight bias effects, the results of Study 2 were similar to Study 1 in 
that support was found only for predictions made for participants in self-agency associated 
conditions.  When participants were induced to feel regret or satisfaction, emotions 
associated with self-agency, they showed hindsight bias after positive feedback but not after 
negative feedback.  When participants were induced to feel disappointment or relief, 
emotions associated with circumstances-agency, the hypotheses were not supported, and 
indeed participants induced to feel disappointment showed an opposite trend to what was 
expected, a low probability estimate whereas participants induced to feel relief showed 
hindsight bias.  What is worthy of note is that in Study 2 the results of some of the indirect 
emotion measures were dissimilar to the results of Study 1.  In Study 2, participants in the 
disappointment and relief conditions perceived the outcomes to be more unexpected and less 
expected than participants in regret and satisfaction conditions.  Yet, the hindsight bias 
patterns were largely similar in both studies, pointing to robustness of the influence on 
hindsight bias estimates. 
Agency and Hindsight Bias 
Do appraisals of agency affect the hindsight bias people show?  There are findings 
that remain consistent across both Studies 1 and 2 that prompt an affirmative response.  In 
both cases hypotheses were supported for the indirect measure assessing whether or not the 
outcome was a result of a choice the participant had made.  In both studies participants 
scored higher on this measure of choice if they were in the self-agency or self-agency 
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associated conditions, and lower if they were in the circumstances-agency or circumstances-
agency associated conditions.  Additionally, in both cases, the sets of paired conditions, 
circumstances-agency, and self-agency, which differed consistently and significantly on this 
measure of choice, differed on the measure assessing hindsight bias.   
Participants in the self-agency conditions showed a different pattern of hindsight bias 
than participants in the circumstances-agency conditions, above and beyond just valence.  As 
proposed, when participants felt responsible for the outcome and it was positive, they 
perceived that outcome as inevitable.  I suggested that they take credit for that success, a 
notion that has been suggested in prior research (Louie, 1999; Louie et al., 2000) and that 
would be easily testable in future research in this realm of emotionally driven judgment 
biases.  When participants felt responsible for the outcome and it was negative, they did not 
perceive that outcome as inevitable.  I suggested that instead they deny blame for failure, 
another testable future hypothesis.  Even though the results for the circumstances-agency 
conditions were not in the predicted direction, the most important and exciting part of the 
story is that the differential effect of agency on hindsight bias seems to be relieable and ready 
to be delved deeper into by future research. 
It is important to emphasize that the current research is focused on self-relevant 
outcomes, and specifically the effect of agency within self-relevant outcomes.  In this way 
my dissertation differs from Fischhoff’s (1975) work, where the events are not self-relevant 
to the participants of his studies, and as such self-relevant motivations would not be 
triggered. 
Agency and Emotion 
  44 
 Does agency act as a differentiator, along with outcome valence, of the emotions 
disappointment and relief, and regret and satisfaction?  It would appear that the answer to 
such a question is a “perhaps”.  The emotion scores followed the trends set forth for different 
emotion measures, but the results were not significant.  However, even though scores on 
appraisal measures such as unexpectedness, expectedness, going toward, or getting away 
from the event were not consistent, scores on the measure assessing whether participants felt 
that the outcome was a result of a choice they had made were consistent.  These results 
suggest that the differences seen in the effects of the pairs of different emotions was at least 
in part influenced by agency.  They suggest too that more research may need to be focused 
on validating and testing the different types of appraisals said to distinguish emotions in 
general, specifically focussing on these four emotions. It may be that a hierarchy of 
appraisals exists. Indeed, it can be acknowledged that given the inconsistent effect of 
emotion across the studies, it could be the case that any effects following emotion inductions 
are due overall to manipulated valence.  Unlike the clear effect of agency on hindsight bias 
evidenced in the studies run, it is not clear that there is an effect of emotion, and future 
research would be needed to shed light on this crucial matter. 
Additionally, even the literature suggests that there is some confusion in 
conceptualizing, articulating, and differentiating similarly valenced emotions.  For example, 
even though after a review of the literature the word “satisfaction” would seem to best match 
the emotion and appraisal given for “positive regret”, other emotion names have been 
suggested.  Some alternative names for regret’s positive complement include rejoicing 
(Connolly & Butler, 2006), pride (Fogel & Berry, 2006), and contentment (Regret, 2006).  
Even relief is proposed as the name of the counterpart to regret, described by Guttentag and 
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Ferrell (2004) as being “an emotion that is experienced in situations in which (a) the actual 
outcome of a course of action is positive or neutral and (b) a possible alternative decision 
would have resulted in a more negative outcome.”  It is possible that participants too were 
somewhat confused when conceptualizing similarly valenced emotions of different agency, 
especially ones such as relief and satisfaction.  This would be an appealing question to 
investigate in future research.  I would recommend qualitative analysis of participants’ 
descriptions of emotional experiences to evaluate exactly what participants envisage when 
using the different emotion words.   
Another question that begs to be asked and answered is whether the agency of the 
outcome paired with the outcome valence of that outcome leads to the emotion felt only, or 
can feeling an emotion lead to a certain appraisal being generated as well?  Specifying the 
directionality of these paths is beyond the scope of this dissertation, though findings do 
suggest that both pathways would work.  In Study 2 induction of emotions triggered solely 
by the emotion words led to distinctive patterns of some indirect emotion ratings.  This is 
another question that future research could look into. 
Colliding: Agency, Emotion, and Hindsight Bias 
I proposed that there is a point where disappointment and regret collide, that point 
being agency, and that the appraisal, paired with the emotion itself, has an impact on 
judgmental biases, specifically hindsight bias.  The research presented here suggests that yes, 
there is definitely a collision point, as agency does seem to factor into distinguishing 
emotions such as disappointment and regret, and relief and satisfaction.  It is clear too, 
however, that the collision described in this dissertation is still being viewed through 
somewhat murky glasses, and more research is needed to act as the cleansing alcohol wipes.   
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An intriguing future research question would be how do different degrees of agency 
affect hindsight bias.  It is possible that that is one difference between Study 1 and Study 2, 
where participants in the circumstances-agency conditions from Study 1 appraised 
themselves as having more choice in the laboratory task than participants in the 
circumstances-agency conditions remembering a past event in Study 2.  An experiment 
explicitly manipulating different degrees of choice perception would add some input to this 
question. 
Other questions emerge from this research, one being the reasoning behind the lack of 
hindsight bias after disappointment in the studies as was hypothesized.  More broadly, what 
is the motivation behind the findings when participants do not feel responsible for the 
outcome received?  In Pezzo and Pezzo’s (2007) work, a rationale is suggested where after 
negative self-relevant outcomes, when that outcome is unexpected, if the sense-making 
activity looking for external reasons for the outcome fails, it is hypothesized that no hindsight 
bias would be revealed.  It is possible that this is what occurred in both studies, where the 
responsibility that participants felt for the outcomes received overwhelmed them, making it 
very difficult to come up with external reasons for their negative outcomes.  Reinforcement 
for this explanation comes from Study 2 where participants found the disappointing outcome 
to be unexpected and the hindsight bias evidenced dropped even more than in Study 1.  
Future research could explore this supposition.  
Conclusion 
So, what would former Secretary of State Colin Powell have said if the situation in 
Iraq had been resolved quickly and with a minimum of bloodshed as White House 
representatives had assured would be the case?  This current research would imply that if all 
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had worked out as in the best case scenario, he would undeniably be exhibiting hindsight 
bias.  However, if former Secretary Powell had not had such a key role in stirring up support 
for the troops being deployed to Iraq, and the outcome had still been as negative as it is 
today, the implications of the current findings are less clear, with more research necessary. 
Taken together, the two studies provide a gateway to researching emotions and 
judgment biases.  The present studies demonstrate that emotions and the appraisals linked 
with them do have an influence on hindsight bias.  There is still much work to be done in this 
area, but it is hoped that this dissertation will provide some of the intial pieces to this huge 
jigsaw puzzle.   
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Figure 1. 
Model of Influence of Specific Emotions on Judgment Biases 
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Figure 2. 
Predicted Hindsight Likelihood Estimates for Study 1 & Study 2 
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Figure 3. 
Study 1: Individual Ratings of Disappointment, Regret, Relief, and Satisfaction, by Outcome 
Valence and Agency 
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Figure 4. 
Study 1: Estimated Likelihood of Generating a Correct Order, by Outcome Valence and 
Agency. 
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Figure 5. 
Study 2: Estimated Likelihood of Having Received the Known Outcome, by Emotion Induced. 
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Table 1. 
 
Study 1: Mean Scores on Four Direct Measures of Disappointment, Regret, Relief, and 
Satisfaction, by Outcome Valence and Agency Conditions. 
 
 
  
 Outcome Valence 
   
 Negative Positive 
   
Circumstances-Agency   
               Disappointment 4.58 (2.57)   .22   (.80) 
               Regret 3.06 (2.83)   .26 (1.02) 
               Relief 2.85 (2.68) 4.07 (3.19) 
               Satisfaction 3.45 (2.02) 7.11 (2.17) 
   
Self-Agency   
               Disappointment 4.30 (2.55)   .12   (.43) 
               Regret 3.43 (3.05)   .08   (.39) 
               Relief 3.03 (2.28) 4.65 (3.01) 
               Satisfaction 3.50 (2.32) 7.96 (1.48) 
   
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 2. 
 
Study 1: Mean Scores on Five Indirect Measures of Disappointment, Regret, Relief, and 
Satisfaction, by Outcome Valence and Agency Conditions. 
 
 
  
 Outcome Valence 
   
 Negative Positive 
   
Circumstances-Agency   
                    Expected 6.30 (1.98) 4.00 (2.22) 
                    Unexpected 3.30 (2.04) 4.96 (2.53) 
                    Get Away  2.30 (2.66)   .85 (2.07) 
                    Choice 5.67 (3.19) 6.26 (2.65) 
                    Go Back  5.12 (3.52)   .11   (.32) 
   
Self-Agency   
                    Expected 5.23 (1.98) 5.35 (2.33) 
                    Unexpected 3.97 (1.99) 4.04 (2.51) 
                    Get Away  2.00 (2.63)   .69 (1.32) 
                    Choice 7.37 (2.53) 7.88 (1.90) 
                    Go Back  6.13 (2.91)   .00   (.00) 
   
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  “Expected” refers to the measure “To what extent was 
the outcome expected?”; “Unexpected” refers to the measure “To what extent was the outcome unexpected?”; 
“Get Away” refers to the measure “To what extent did you feel a tendency to want to get away from the event 
after you knew the outcome?”; “Choice” refers to the measure “To what extent was the outcome of the event 
the result of a choice you made?”;  and “Go Back” refers to the measure ““To what extent did you feel a 
tendency to want to go back and change things after you knew the outcome?” 
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Table 3. 
 
Study 1: Mean Scores on Three Measures of Hindsight Bias, by Outcome Valence and 
Agency Conditions. 
 
 
  
 Outcome Valence 
   
 Negative Positive 
   
Circumstances-Agency   
                    Likelihood Correct 50.61 (27.04) 51.33 (25.37) 
                    Inevitable   4.64   (2.62)   3.11   (2.75) 
                    Foreseeable    6.06   (2.18)   3.78   (2.29) 
   
Self-Agency   
                    Likelihood Correct 47.73 (22.80) 68.42 (20.94) 
                    Inevitable   3.47   (2.61)   3.85   (3.07) 
                    Foreseeable    5.73   (2.03)   4.92   (2.56) 
   
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  “Likelihood Correct” refers to the probability estimate 
participants gave for how likely they thought they were to have been told their order was correct; “Inevitable” 
refers to the measure “To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was inevitable?”; and 
“Foreseeable” refers to the measure “To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was 
foreseeable?”  
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Table 4. 
 
Study 2: Mean Scores on Four Direct Measures of Disappointment, Regret, Relief, and 
Satisfaction, by Emotion Induced and Thoughts Agency. 
 
 
  
 Direct Emotion Measure 
Emotion Induced/ 
Thought Agency 
    
 Disappointment Regret Relief Satisfaction 
     
Control/ No Thoughts     
               
Disappointment 
7.65 (2.26) 5.88 (2.78) 1.18 (1.01)   .82 (1.24) 
               Regret 6.53 (2.62) 6.00 (2.62) 3.06 (2.99) 3.12 (2.59) 
               Relief 1.56 (2.19) 1.06 (1.65) 8.63   (.72) 8.06 (1.06) 
               Satisfaction   .63 (1.31) 2.13 (3.10) 7.88 (1.45) 8.38   (.72) 
     
Circumstances-Agency     
               
Disappointment 
8.00   (.97) 4.90 (2.65) 1.85 (2.01) 1.70 (1.75) 
               Regret 7.91 (1.08) 7.91 (1.03) 2.22 (2.43) 1.17 (1.34)    
               Relief 1.00 (2.68) 1.33 (1.17) 8.71   (.69) 8.33   (.87) 
               Satisfaction 1.00 (2.32) 1.30 (2.18) 7.75 (2.42) 8.00 (2.00) 
     
Self-Agency     
               
Disappointment 
7.96 (1.62) 6.00 (2.49) 2.14 (1.86) 1.82 (2.09) 
               Regret 7.50 (1.79) 6.61 (1.77) 2.32 (2.28) 1.96 (2.04) 
               Relief 1.38 (2.30) 1.54 (2.23) 8.08 (1.72) 7.58 (1.86) 
               Satisfaction 1.11 (1.60) 1.19 (1.30) 8.04 (1.83) 8.26 (1.09) 
     
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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  Table 5. 
 
  Study 2: Mean Scores on Five Indirect Measures of Disappointment, Regret, Relief, and   
  Satisfaction, by Emotion Induced and Thoughts Agency. 
 
 
  
 Emotion Induced 
     
 Disappointment Regret Relief Satisfaction 
     
Control/ No Thoughts     
               Expected 3.06 (2.77) 3.94 (2.38) 4.69 (1.99) 5.38 (1.54) 
               Unexpected 5.82 (2.35) 4.59 (2.00) 5.81 (1.56) 5.13 (2.31) 
               Get Away 6.76 (2.82) 5.53 (2.79) 3.25 (3.19) 2.56 (2.76) 
               Choice 5.41 (3.04) 6.65 (2.64) 6.63 (2.53) 6.88 (2.03) 
               Go Back 7.88 (1.62) 7.06 (2.93) 2.06 (2.52) 1.63 (2.53) 
     
Circumstances-Agency     
               Expected 2.80 (2.12) 4.35 (2.79) 3.79 (2.32) 5.80 (2.91) 
               Unexpected 6.10 (1.68) 3.96 (2.57) 5.46 (2.69) 4.35 (2.74) 
               Get Away 6.55 (1.93) 7.09 (1.59) 2.50 (3.01) 2.05 (3.03) 
               Choice 3.95 (2.28) 7.57 (2.11) 6.75 (1.87) 7.15 (2.70) 
               Go Back 7.25 (1.80) 8.09 (1.34) 2.54 (2.06) 2.15 (2.92) 
     
Self-Agency     
               Expected 3.79 (2.20) 5.54 (2.44) 4.96 (2.16) 6.52 (1.40) 
               Unexpected 5.61 (2.28) 4.32 (2.76) 4.88 (2.49) 3.78 (2.45) 
               Get Away 6.11 (2.38) 6.57 (1.89) 2.50 (3.20) 2.52 (2.81) 
               Choice 5.50 (2.51) 6.75 (2.26) 7.25 (1.67) 7.81   (.96) 
               Go Back 7.68 (1.68) 7.82 (1.61) 2.25 (2.72) 2.11 (2.65) 
     
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  “Expected” refers to the measure “To what 
extent was the outcome expected?”; “Unexpected” refers to the measure “To what extent was the 
outcome unexpected?”; “Get Away” refers to the measure “To what extent did you feel a tendency to 
want to get away from the event after you knew the outcome?”; “Choice” refers to the measure “To 
what extent was the outcome of the event the result of a choice you made?”;  and “Go Back” refers to 
the measure ““To what extent did you feel a tendency to want to go back and change things after you 
knew the outcome?” 
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  Table 6. 
 
  Study 2: Mean Scores on Three Measures of Hindsight Bias, by Emotion Induced and   
  Thoughts Agency. 
 
  
 Emotion Induced 
     
 Disappointment Regret Relief Satisfaction 
     
Control/ No Thoughts     
             Likelihood Known 34.71 (25.40) 46.88 (28.34) 59.69 (23.84) 72.81 (22.43) 
             Inevitable   2.53   (2.24)   3.76   (2.59)   4.06   (2.20)   3.56   (2.13) 
             Foreseeable    3.24   (1.82)   4.76   (2.02)   4.63   (1.89)   5.38   (1.67) 
     
Circumstances-Agency     
             Likelihood Known 33.10 (26.44) 51.96 (26.83) 61.46 (23.01) 78.60 (19.59) 
             Inevitable   3.60   (2.04)   3.35   (2.21)   2.92   (2.53)   3.40   (2.60) 
             Foreseeable    3.30   (1.75)   4.74   (2.78)   4.42   (2.25)   6.30   (1.75) 
     
Self-Agency     
             Likelihood Known 40.89 (30.55) 57.50 (32.47) 61.96 (24.90) 76.33 (19.53) 
             Inevitable   3.43   (2.08)   3.46   (2.59)   3.04   (2.40)   3.63   (2.15) 
             Foreseeable    4.21  (2.23)   5.07   (2.31)   5.04   (1.92)   6.33   (1.24) 
     
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  “Likelihood Known” refers to the probability 
estimate participants gave for how likely they thought that the outcome was to have occurred; 
“Inevitable” refers to the measure “To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced 
was inevitable?”; and “Foreseeable” refers to the measure “To what extent would you say that the 
outcome you experienced was foreseeable?”
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1
  60 
Initial Instructions to All Participants 
 
 
Making Judgments! 
 
Welcome to our experiment and thanks for participating.   
 
We are conducting a study to see how people make real-life decisions 
such as how much different items cost and whether or not to purchase 
those items. 
 
In this particular experiment, we will ask you to make judgments about 
the prices of certain items, specifically plane ticket prices, and to put 
these items in the order asked for.  You will then be asked a series of 
questions about your reactions to this event. 
 
 
ID #:  
(On the desk in front of you) 
Continue 
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Wish you were traveling 
right now? 
  62 
Traveling the world, seeing new things, meeting new people…what can 
compare?  Maybe you are a seasoned world traveler, or maybe you have 
not yet been outside of North Carolina; whatever the case, summer is 
coming, and with it the opportunity to go somewhere!! 
 
Imagine that you are thinking of taking a trip this summer by yourself 
or with friends.  There are so many possible places to see, so many 
potential destinations that you could potentially visit.  How do you 
choose where to go? 
 
Usually it comes down to the budget. Where do you think you can 
afford to go? How much do you think the plane tickets will cost? 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continue 
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Agency Manipulation & Task: Circumstances-agency 
 
 
Start: 
 
In this experiment we will ask you place 5 potential destinations in 
order of plane ticket price, the average price of a round-trip ticket from 
Raleigh-Durham International Airport to that destination.   
 
You will create two different orders, each descending from 5, the most 
expensive location, to 1, the least expensive location.  These orders will 
be your two best guesses, and different from each other. 
 
The experimenter will look at and evaluate both orders, but only one 
will count, one that will be randomly chosen for you.  This order will be 
the submitted one.  
 
Participants whose submitted order is correct will be entered into a 
drawing for $35.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continue 
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 Please put your order numbers in the spaces given below.  The two guesses you give should be different from   
 each other.  When you are finished, please continue on to the next page to see which order has been randomly   
 chosen to be submitted for you, then give this questionnaire to the experimenter. 
 
 
Order #1: Order #2: 
5 = Most Expensive 
1 = Least Expensive 
5 = Most Expensive 
 1 = Least Expensive 
  
 Paris, France  Paris, France 
 Bridgetown, Barbados   Bridgetown, Barbados  
 Bangkok, Thailand  Bangkok, Thailand 
 Stockholm, Sweden  Stockholm, Sweden 
 Puerto Vallarta, Mexico  Puerto Vallarta, Mexico 
 
 
Experimenter Only 
 
Submitted: 
 
(Unsubmitted:                                           ) 
Continue 
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Order #2 has been randomly chosen to be submitted. 
 
Order #1 will be evaluated too but will not count. 
 
 
 
Please turn this document in to the experimenter once you reach 
this point. 
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Agency Manipulation & Task: Self-Agency 
 
 
Start: 
 
In this experiment we will ask you place 5 potential destinations in 
order of plane ticket price, the average price of a round-trip ticket from 
Raleigh-Durham International Airport to that destination.   
 
You will create two different orders, each descending from 5, the most 
expensive location, to 1, the least expensive location.  These orders will 
be your two best guesses, and different from each other. 
 
The experimenter will look at and evaluate both orders, but only one 
will count, one that you will choose.  This order will be the submitted 
one.  
 
Participants whose submitted order is correct will be entered into a 
drawing for $35.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continue 
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Please put your order numbers in the spaces given below.  The two guesses you give should be different from 
each other.  When you are finished, please continue onto the next page to choose the order to be submitted, then 
give this questionnaire to the experimenter. 
 
 
Order #1: Order #2: 
5 = Most Expensive 
1 = Least Expensive 
5 = Most Expensive 
 1 = Least Expensive 
  
 Paris, France  Paris, France 
 Bridgetown, Barbados   Bridgetown, Barbados  
 Bangkok, Thailand  Bangkok, Thailand 
 Stockholm, Sweden  Stockholm, Sweden 
 Puerto Vallarta, Mexico  Puerto Vallarta, Mexico 
 
 
Experimenter Only 
 
Submitted: 
 
(Unsubmitted:                                           ) 
Continue 
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Which order do you choose to be submitted? Circle your choice. 
 
Order #1 
 
Order #2 
 
 
Please turn this document in to the experimenter once 
you reach this point. 
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Outcome Valence Manipulation 
 
Failure:  
Submitted:  Incorrect 
 
(Unsubmitted:   Correct) 
 
Success: 
Submitted:  Correct 
 
(Unsubmitted:  Incorrect) 
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Items Measured 
 
 
Event Questions 
 
Keeping the task you just completed in mind, please answer the following questions about 
your reactions to this event.  Circle the number that corresponds to your response. 
 
1. To what extent was the outcome negative? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
2. Which 1 word listed below best describes how you feel in reaction to your outcome 
in this task? (Please underline one) 
 
Disappointed Fearful 
Angry Relieved 
Satisfied Happy 
Sad Regretful 
 
 
3. To what extent was the outcome positive? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
4. Which face(s) listed below best express your reaction to your outcome in this task?  
(Circle all that fit) 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
Not at all 
Positive 
Very 
Positive 
Not at all 
Negative 
Very 
Negative 
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5. To what extent were you fearful after the outcome? 
 
                  0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
6. To what extent were you disappointed after the outcome? 
 
                0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
7. To what extent were you angry after the outcome? 
 
                  0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
8. To what extent was the outcome expected? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
9. Think back to right before you were given feedback on your ordering.  If someone 
had asked you at that point how likely you were to get the feedback that your 
submitted order was correct, what would you have said?   
Give a percentage ranging from 0% to 100%, where 0% would mean “I thought there 
was no chance of it being correct,” and 100% would mean “I thought it would definitely 
be correct.” 
 
________% 
 
10. To what extent were you happy after the outcome? 
 
              0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
11. To what extent were you regretful after the outcome? 
 
            0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
Not at all  
Disappointed 
Very 
Disappointed 
Not at all  
Happy 
Very 
Happy 
Not at all 
Regretful 
Very 
Regretful 
Not at all 
Expected 
Very 
Expected 
Not at all  
Angry 
Very 
Angry 
Not at all  
Fearful 
Very 
Fearful 
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12. To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was inevitable? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9   
 
 
 
 
13. To what extent was the outcome unexpected? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
 
14. To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was 
foreseeable? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
15. To what extent did you want to get away from the event after you knew the 
outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINISHED 
Please turn this document in to the experimenter. 
Thank you for your time. 
Not at all  
Inevitable 
Very 
Inevitable 
Not at all  
Foreseeable 
Very 
Foreseeable 
Not at all  
Wanting to 
Get Away 
Very Much 
Wanting to Get 
Away 
Not at all 
Unexpected 
Very 
Unexpected 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 2
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Initial Instructions to All Participants 
 
Life Experiences 
 
Welcome to our experiment and thanks for participating.   
 
We are conducting a study to see if people’s recollections of past events are 
impacted by how they have been socialized. This is a collaborative research 
effort between researchers in universities across the country.   
 
In this particular experiment, we will ask you to recall a particular past event 
and then to answer questions about your reactions to it.  We ask that you 
describe the event you are recalling in as much detail as you can, and try to 
imagine yourself in the situation as if it were actually occurring to you at this 
moment.   
 
We ask that you not rush through this task.  
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Emotion Manipulation 
 
Disappointment: 
We want you to recall a past experience that happened within the last three years. 
Specifically we want you to recall an exam experience you have had where you 
felt disappointment after you found out the outcome. 
 
Please use the space given below and on the next page if needed to describe this 
event when you felt disappointment.  Be vivid and detailed enough so that a reader 
experiences the event in the same way that you did.   
 
 
Relief: 
We want you to recall a past experience that happened within the last three years. 
Specifically we want you to recall an exam experience you have had where you 
felt relief after you found out the outcome. 
 
Please use the space given below and on the next page if needed to describe this 
event when you felt relief.  Be vivid and detailed enough so that a reader 
experiences the event in the same way that you did.   
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Regret: 
We want you to recall a past experience that happened within the last three years. 
Specifically we want you to recall an exam experience you have had where you 
felt regret after you found out the outcome. 
 
Please use the space given below and on the next page if needed to describe this 
event when you felt regret.  Be vivid and detailed enough so that a reader 
experiences the event in the same way that you did.   
 
 
Satisfaction: 
We want you to recall a past experience that happened within the last three years. 
Specifically we want you to recall an exam experience you have had where you 
felt satisfaction after you found out the outcome. 
 
Please use the space given below and on the next page if needed to describe this 
event when you felt satisfaction.  Be vivid and detailed enough so that a reader 
experiences the event in the same way that you did.  
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Thought Manipulation (Agency) 
 
Circumstances-agency (for Disappointment and Regret Emotion Manipulation Conditions): 
In the spaces provided below, please list 5 ways the situation could have been 
different that would have led to a better outcome occurring. 
1. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
2. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
3. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
4. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
5. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
 
Circumstances-agency (for Relief and Satisfaction Emotion Manipulation Conditions): 
In the spaces provided below, please list 5 ways the situation could have been 
different that would have led to a worse outcome occurring. 
1. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
2. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
3. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
4. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
5. There could have _______________________________________________________. 
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Self-Agency (for Disappointment and Regret Emotion Manipulation Conditions): 
In the spaces provided below, please list 5 different choices you could have made 
that would have led to a better outcome occurring. 
1. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
2. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
3. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
4. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
5. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
 
Self-Agency (for Relief and Satisfaction Emotion Manipulation Conditions): 
In the spaces provided below, please list 5 different choices you could have made 
that would have led to a worse outcome occurring. 
1. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
2. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
3. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
4. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
5. I could have ____________________________________________________________. 
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Items Measured  
 
Life Event Questions 
 
Keeping the event you just described in mind, please answer the following questions about your reaction 
to this event: 
 
1. Think back to a time before you knew the outcome of the exam.  
 
If someone had asked you at that point how likely you were to perform badly on the exam, what 
would you have said?  Give a percentage ranging from 0% to 100%, where 0% would mean “I 
thought there was no chance of it turning out badly/well,” and 100% would mean “I knew it would 
definitely turn out badly/well.” 
 
________% 
 
 
2. To what extent were you happy after the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
3. To what extent were you regretful after the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
4. How much was the outcome of the event the result of a choice you made? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
Not at all  
Happy Very Happy 
Not at all 
Regretful Very 
Regretful 
Not at all  
A Result 
Very much 
A Result 
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5. To what extent were you satisfied after the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
6. To what extent was the outcome unexpected? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
7. To what extent were you sad after the outcome? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
8. How responsible did you feel for the outcome of the event? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
9. To what extent were you relieved after the outcome? 
 
            0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
10. To what extent did you want to go back and change things after you knew the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
Not at all  
Relieved 
Very 
Relieved 
Not at all 
Sad 
Very 
Sad 
Not at all 
Satisfied Very 
Satisfied 
Not at all  
Wanting to 
Change 
Things 
Very Much 
Wanting to 
Change Things 
Not at all  
Responsible 
Very 
Responsible 
Not at all 
Unexpected 
Very 
Unexpected 
  
 
 
81 
11. To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was inevitable? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9   
 
 
 
 
12. How much control did you have over the outcome of the event? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
13. To what extent would you say that the outcome you experienced was foreseeable? 
 
0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
14. To what extent did you want to get away from the event after you knew the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
 
15. To what extent was the outcome negative? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
16. To what extent were you fearful after the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
Not at all 
Negative Very 
Negative 
Not at all  
Foreseeable 
Very 
Foreseeable 
Not at all  
Wanting to 
Get Away 
Very Much 
Wanting to Get 
Away 
Not at all  
In Control 
Very 
In Control 
Not at all  
Fearful 
Very 
Fearful 
Not at all  
Inevitable 
Very 
Inevitable 
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17. To what extent were you disappointed after the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
18. To what extent was the outcome positive? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
19. To what extent were you angry after the outcome? 
 
   0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
20. To what extent was the outcome expected? 
 
 0             1             2             3             4             5             6             7              8             9 
 
 
 
 
21. (Only for thought manipulation conditions) You were asked to list 5 thoughts about the past event 
described that could have led to a different outcome.  To what extent was it difficult or easy to 
generate those 5 thoughts? 
 -4              -3              -2              -1              0              1              2              3               4              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please turn in both sections to the 
experimenter once you are finished. 
Difficult to 
Generate 
Easy to 
Generate  
Not at all 
Positive 
Very 
Positive 
Not at all 
Expected 
Very 
Expected 
Not at all  
Angry 
Very 
Angry 
Not at all  
Disappointed 
Very 
Disappointed 
  
 
 
83 
REFERENCES 
Arkes, H. R., Faust, D., Guilmette, T. J., & Hart, K. (1988). Eliminating the hindsight bias.  
 Journal of Applied Psychology, 66, 252-254. 
 
Arkes, H. R., Wortmann, R. L. Saville, P. D., & Harkness, A.R. (1981). Hindsight bias 
 among  physicians weighing the likelihood of diagnoses.  Journal of Applied 
 Psychology, 66, 252-254. 
 
Beckerian, D. A., and Bowers, J. M., (1983). Eyewitness testimony: Were we misled?  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 139–145. 
 
Bell, D. E. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 30, 
 961-981. 
 
Bell, D. E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations 
 Research, 33, 1-27. 
 
Bodenhausen, G., Sheppard, L., & Kramer, G. (1994). Negative affect and social judgment: 
 The different impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
 24, 45-62. 
 
Christensen-Szalanski, J. J., and Willham, C. F. (1991). The hindsight bias: A meta-analysis.  
 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 48, 147–168. 
 
Clark M. S., & Isen, A. M. (1982). Towards understanding the relationship between feeling 
 states and social behavior. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds), Cognitive social 
 psychology.  Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland. 
 
Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1994). Affective causes and consequences of 
 social information processing. In R.S. Wyer & T.K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social 
 cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Connolly, T. & Butler, D. (2006). Regret in economic and psychological theories of choice.  
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. Special Issue: The Role of Affect in Decision 
Making, 19, 139-154. 
Connolly, T., Ordóñez, L. D., & Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsibility in the  
  evaluation  of decision outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision   
  Processes, 70, 73–85. 
DeSteno, D., Petty, R. E., Rucker, D. D, Wegener, D. T., & Braverman, J. (2004). Discrete 
 emotions  and persuasion: The role of emotion-induced expectancies. Journal of 
 Personality & Social Psychology 86, 43-56.  
 
  
 
 
84 
DeSteno, D., Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & Rucker, D. D. (2000). Beyond valence in the 
 perception of likelihood: The role of emotion specificity. Journal of Personality and 
 Social Psychology, 78, 397–416. 
 
Elster, J. (1998). Emotions and economic theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 47-74. 
 
Erdfelder, E., & Buchner, A. (1998).  Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial  
processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 24, 387-414. 
 
Fischhoff, B. (1975).  Hindsight ≠ foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment 
 under uncertainty.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
 Performance, 1, 288-299. 
 
Fischhoff, B. and Beyth, R. (1975). "I knew it would happen": Remembered probabilities of  
once-future things.  Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 13, 1-16 
 
Fogel, S. O. & T. Berry (2006). The disposition effect and individual investor decisions: 
the roles of regret and counterfactual alternatives. Journal of Behavioral Finance 7, 
107-116. 
 
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological 
 Bulletin, 117, 39-66. 
 
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & Ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and   
  emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 212– 
  228. 
Furr, R. M., & Rosenthal, R. (2003). Evaluating theories efficiently: The nuts and bolts of  
  contrast analysis. Understanding Statistics, 2, 45-67. 
 
George, J. M., & Brief, A. P. (1992). Feeling good, doing good: A conceptual analysis of the 
 mood at work - organizational spontaneity relationship. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 
 310-329. 
 
Guilbault, R. L., Bryant, F. B., Brockway, J. H., & Posava, E. J. (2004). A meta-analysis of 
research on hindsight bias. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26, 103-117. 
 
Guttentag, R. E., & Ferrell, J. M. (2004). Reality compared with its alternatives: Age  
differences in judgments of regret and relief. Developmental Psychology, 40, 764-
775. 
 
Hasher, L., Attig, M. S., & Alba, J. (1981). I knew it all along: Or, did I?  Journal of Verbal  
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 89-96. 
  
 
 
85 
 
Hawkins, S. A., & Hastie, R. (1990). Hindsight: Biased judgment of past events after the  
outcomes are known. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 311-327. 
 
Hell, W., Gigerenzer, G., Gauggel, S., Mall, M., & Müller, M. (1988). Hindsight bias: An
 interaction of automatic and motivational factors. Memory & Cognition, 16, 533-538. 
 
Henriksen, K. & Kaplan, H. (2003). Hindsight bias, outcome knowledge and adaptive 
 learning. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 12, 46-50. 
 
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280-1300.  
 
Hoch, S. J., & Lowenstein G. F. (1991). Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self- 
Control. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 492-507. 
 
Hoffrage, U., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Hindsight bias: A by-product of  
knowledge updating? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & 
Cognition, 26, 566-581. 
Kahneman, D. & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.  
  Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.  
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic,  
& A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 201-
208). New  York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Kamin, K. A., & Rachlinski J. J. (1995). Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in  
Hindsight. Law and Human Behavior, 19, 89-104. 
 
Krakauer, J. (1997). Into Thin Air: a Personal Account of the Mount Everest Disaster. New  
  York, NY: Villard. 
 
Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple pessimism: Effects of 
 sadness and anger on social perception. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 64, 740-752.  
 
Lauer, M. (Host). (2004, September 8). Powell Calls for Perseverance in Iraq Despite  
Military Losses. NBC's Today Show with Matt Lauer. NBC. Transcript retrieved 
November 11, 2006, from: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/040908_persevere.html 
 
Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Leary, M. R. (1981). The distorted nature of hindsight. Journal of Social Psychology, 115, 
 25-29. 
 
Leary, M. R. (1982). Distorted hindsight and the 1980 Presidential election. Personality and  
  
 
 
86 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 257-263. 
 
Lehrer, J. (2005, January 13). Newsmaker: Colin Powell.  News Hour with Jim Lehrer.   
Public Broadcasting Service.  Transcript retrieved November 11, from: http://www. 
pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/jan-june05/powell_1-13.html 
 
Lerner, J. S., Goldberg, J. H., & Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Sober second thought: the effects of 
 accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility. 
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 563-574. 
 
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., & Fischhoff, B. (2003). Effects of fear and 
 anger on perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment. Psychological 
 Science, 14, 144-150. 
 
Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific 
 influences on judgment and choice. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 473- 493. 
 
Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality & Social 
 Psychology, 81, 146-159. 
 
Lerner, J. S., & Tiedens L. Z. (2006). Portrait of the angry decision maker: How appraisal 
 tendencies shape anger's influence on cognition. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
 Making, 19, 115-137. 
 
Louie, T. A. (1999). Decision makers’ hindsight bias after receiving favorable and 
 unfavorable feedback. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 29-41. 
 
Louie, T. A., Curren, M. T., & Harrich, K. R. (2000). “I knew we would win”: Hindsight 
 bias for favorable and unfavorable team decision outcomes. Journal of Applied 
 Psychology, 85, 264-272. 
 
Mark, M. M., Boburka, R. R., Eyssell, K. M., Cohen, L. L., & Mellor, S. (2003). "I couldn't 
 have seen it coming": The impact of negative self-relevant outcomes on 
 retrospections about foreseeability. Memory, 11, 443-454. 
 
Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I. (1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional 
 reactions to the outcomes of risky options. Psychological Science, 8, 423-429. 
 
Mellers, B., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999). Emotion-based choice. Journal of 
 Experimental Psychology-General, 128, 332-345. 
 
Nabi, R. L. (2003). The framing effects of emotion: Can discrete emotions influence 
 information recall and policy preference? Communication Research, 30, 224-247. 
 
Oliver, R. L. (1997). Satisfaction: A behavioral perspective on the consumer. New York: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
  
 
 
87 
 
O'Rorke, P., & Ortony, A. (1994). Explaining emotions. Cognitive Science, 18, 283-323. 
Ordóñez, L. D., & Connolly, T. (2000). Regret and responsibility: A reply to Zeelenberg et  
  al. (1998). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 132–142. 
Ortony, A., Clore, G., & Collins, A. (1988). The Cognitive Structure of the Emotions. New 
 York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pennington, D. C., Rutter, D. R., McKenna, K., & Morley, I. E. (1980) Estimating the 
 outcome of a pregnancy test: Women’s judgments in foresight and hindsight. British 
 Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 317–324. 
 
Pezzo, M. V. (2003). Surprise, defence, or making sense: What removes the hindsight bias? 
 Memory, 11, 421-441. 
 
Pezzo, M. V.,  & Pezzo, S. P. (2007). Making sense of failure: A motivated model of 
            hindsight bias. Social Cognition , 25, 147-164. 
 
Pohl, R., Schwarz, S., Sczesny, S., & Stahlberg, S. (2003). Hindsight bias in gustatory 
 judgments. Experimental Psychology, 50, 107-115. 
 
Rachlinski, J. (1998). A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight. University of 
 Chicago Law Review, 65, 571-625. 
 
Regret. (2006). Microsoft Encarta Thesaurus. Retrieved December 20, 2006, from: http://  
  encarta.msn.com/thesaurus_561585754/regret.html 
 
Renner, B. (2003).  Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A  
motivational perspective.  Memory, 11, 455-472.   
 
Ricks, T. E., & Wright, R. (2004).  Powell Advised Bush to Add Iraq Troops. The  
Washington Post.  Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/ articles/A23381-2004Dec23.html 
Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 133-148. 
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1996). Counterfactuals, causal attributions, and the hindsight 
      bias: A conceptual integration. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32,  
197- 227.  
 
Roseman, I. J. (1984). Cognitive determinants of emotion: A structural theory. In P. Shaver 
 (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology: Emotions, relationships, and 
 health (pp. 11-36). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
  
 
 
88 
Roseman, I. J. (1991). Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 
 5, 161-200. 
 
Roseman, I. J. (2001). A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, 
 research, and applications. In K. R. Scherer & A. Schorr (Eds)., Appraisal processes 
 in emotion: Theory, methods, research (pp. 68-91). New York: Oxford University 
 Press. 
 
Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A., & Jose, P. E. (1996). Appraisal determinant s of emotions: 
 Constructing a more accurate and comprehensiv e theory. Cognition and Emotion, 10, 
 241–277. 
 
Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R. L., & Rubin, D. B. (2000). Contrasts and effect sizes in  
  behavioral research: A correlational approach. Cambridge, England: Cambridge  
  University Press. 
 
Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2004). An Emotion Specificity Approach to Consumer 
 Decision Making. Motivation and Emotion, 28, 3-21.  
 
Sanna, L. J., & Schwarz, N. (2007). Metacognitive experiences and hindsight bias: It's not 
 just the thought (content) that counts! Social Cognition, 25, 228-249.   
 
Sanna L. J., Schwarz, N., & Small, E. M. (2002) a. Accessibility experiences and the 
 hindsight bias: I knew it along versus it could never have happened. Memory and 
 Cognition, 30, 1288-1296. 
 
Sanna, L. J., Schwarz, N., & Stocker, S. L. (2002) b. When debiasing backfires: Assessible 
 content and assessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 28, 497-502. 
 
Scherer, K. R. (2003). Introduction: Cognitive components of emotion. In R. J. Davidson, H. 
 Goldsmith, K. R. Scherer (Eds.), Handbook of the Affective Sciences (pp. 563-571). 
 New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Scherer, K., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (Eds.). (2001). Appraisal processes in emotion: 
 Theory, methods, research. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of 
 affective states. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation 
 and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2; pp. 527-561). New York, NY: 
 Guilford Press. 
 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: 
  Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and 
 Social Psychology, 45, 513 - 523. 
 
  
 
 
89 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1988). How do I feel about it? Informative functions of 
 affective states. In K. Fiedler, & J. Forgas (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and social 
 behavior (pp. 44-62). Toronto, Canada: Hogrefe International. 
 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1996). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. In E. T. Higgins 
 & A. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 433-
 465). New York: Guilford. 
 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2003). Mood as information: 20 years later. Psychological 
 Inquiry, 14, 296-303. 
 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2007). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. In E. T. 
 Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology. Handbook of basic principles 
 (2nd ed.; pp. 385-407). New York: Guilford. 
 
Schwarz, N., Sanna, L. J., Skurnik, I., & Yoon, C. (2007). The intricacies of setting people 
 straight: Implications for debiasing and public information campaigns. Advances in 
 Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 127-161.  
 
Shepperd, J. A., & McNulty, J. K. (2002). The affective consequences of expected and 
 unexpected outcomes. Psychological Science, 13, 85-88. 
 
Simonson, I. (1992). The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on Purchase 
 Decisions. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 105-118. 
 
Slovic, P. & Fischhoff, B.  (1977). On the psychology of experimental surprises. Journal of  
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3, 544-551. 
 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1987). Patterns of appraisal and emotion related to taking 
 an exam. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 475-488. 
 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Cognitive ability and variation in selection task  
performance. Thinking and Reasoning, 4, 193-230. 
 
Sue, S., Smith, R. E., & Caldwell, C. (1973). Effects of inadmissable evidence on the  
decisions of simulated jurors: A moral dilemma. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 3, 344-353. 
 
Synodinos, N. E. (1986). Hindsight distortion: "I knew-it-all along and I was sure about it." 
 Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16, 107-117. 
 
Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). The effect of anger on the hostile inferences of aggressive and 
 nonaggressive people: Specific emotions, cognitive processing, and chronic 
 accessibility. Motivation and Emotion, 25, 233-251. 
 
Tykocinski, O. E. (2001). I never had a chance: Using hindsight tactics to mitigate  
  
 
 
90 
disappointments. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 376-382. 
 
Tykocinski, O.E., Pick, D., & Kedmi, D. (2002). Retroactive pessimism: A different kind  
of hindsight bias. European Journal of Social Psychology.  32, 577-588. 
 
van Dijk, W.W., & van der Pligt, J. (1997). The impact of probability and  magnitude of  
 outcome on disappointment and elation. Organizational Behavior and Human 
 Decision Processes, 69, 277-284. 
 
van Dijk, W. W., & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). What do we talk about when we talk about 
 disappointment? Cognition and Emotion, 16, 787-807. 
 
van Dijk, W. W., Zeelenberg, M., & van der Pligt, J. (2003). Blessed are those who expect 
 nothing: Lowering expectations as a way of avoiding disappointment. Journal of 
 Economic Psychology, 24, 505-516. 
 
Verplanken, B., & Pieters, R. G. M. (1988).  Individual differences in hindsight bias: I never 
 thought something like Chernobyl would happen.  Did I?  Journal of Behavioral 
 Decision Making, 1, 31-147. 
 
Wasserman, D., Lampert, R. O., & Hastie, R. (1991).  Hindsight and causality. Personality & 
 Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 30-35. 
 
Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K. M., and Obstfeld, D.  2005.  Organizing and the process of 
 sensemaking.  Organization Science, 16, 409-421.   
 
Wood, G. (1978). The knew-it-all-along effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 4, 345-353. 
 
Zeelenberg, M. (1999). The use of crying over spilled milk: A note on the rationality and 
 functionality of regret. Philosophical Psychology, 12, 325-340. 
 
Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, F. G. M. (2004). Beyond valence in customer dissatisfaction: A 
 review and new findings on behavioral responses to regret and disappointment in 
 failed services. Journal of Business Research, 57, 445-455.  
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2000). Regret and responsibility  
  resolved? Evaluating Ordóñez and Connolly’s (2000) conclusions. Organizational  
  Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 143–154. 
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Reconsidering the relation  
  between regret and responsibility. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision  
  Processes, 74, 254–272. 
  
 
 
91 
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., Manstead, A. S. R., & van der Pligt, J. (2000). On bad 
 decisions and disconfirmed expectancies: The psychology of regret and 
 disappointment. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 521-541. 
 
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., van der Pligt, J., Manstead, A. S. R., van Empelen, P., & 
 Reinderman, D. (1998) a. Emotional reactions to the outcomes of decisions: The role 
of counterfactual thought in the experience of regret and disappointment. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75, 117-141. 
 
